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In recent decades, there has been a huge improvement and interest from the
research community in wireless multi-hop networks. Such networks have widespread
applications in civil, commercial and military applications. Paradigms of this type
of networks that are critical for many aspects of human lives are mobile ad-hoc
networks, sensor networks, which are used for monitoring buildings and large agri-
cultural areas, and vehicular networks with applications in traffic monitoring and
regulation. Internet of Things (IoT) is also envisioned as a multi-hop network con-
sisting of small interconnected devices, called “things”, such as smart meters, smart
traffic lights, thermostats etc.
Wireless multi-hop networks suffer from resource constraints, because all the
devices have limited battery, computational power and memory. Battery level of
these devices should be preserved in order to ensure reliability and communication
across the network. In addition, these devices are not a priori designed to defend
against sophisticated adversaries, which may be deployed across the network in
order to disrupt network operation. In addition, the distributed nature of this type
of networks introduces another limitation to protocol performance in the presence
of adversaries. Hence, the inherit nature of this type of networks poses severe
limitations on designing and optimizing protocols and network operations. In this
dissertation, we focus on proposing novel techniques for designing more resilient
protocols to attackers and more energy efficient protocols.
In the first part of the dissertation, we investigate the scenario of multiple
adversaries deployed across the network, which reduce significantly the network
performance. We adopt a component-based and a cross-layer view of network pro-
tocols to make protocols secure and resilient to attacks and to utilize our techniques
across existing network protocols. We use the notion of trust between network en-
tities to propose lightweight defense mechanisms, which also satisfy performance
requirements. Using cryptographic primitives in our network scenario can introduce
significant computational overhead. In addition, behavioral aspects of entities are
not captured by cryptographic primitives. Hence, trust metrics provide an efficient
security metric in these scenarios, which can be utilized to introduce lightweight
defense mechanisms applicable to deployed network protocols.
In the second part of the dissertation, we focus on energy efficiency consider-
ations in this type of networks. Our motivation for this work is to extend network
lifetime, but at the same time maintain critical performance requirements. We
propose a distributed sleep management framework for heterogeneous machine-to-
machine networks and two novel energy efficient metrics. This framework and the
routing metrics are integrated into existing routing protocols for machine-to-machine
networks. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach in terms of increasing net-
work lifetime and maintaining packet delivery ratio. Furthermore, we propose a
novel multi-metric energy efficient routing protocol for dynamic networks (i.e. mo-
bile ad-hoc networks) and illustrate its performance in terms of network lifetime.
Finally, we investigate the energy-aware sensor coverage problem and we propose
a novel game theoretic approach to capture the tradeoff between sensor coverage
efficiency and energy consumption.
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Wireless multi-hop networks have attracted a lot of interest from the research
community, because of their wide range of applications from military networks to
emergency response networks, sensor networks and healthcare systems. There have
been several efforts to make these type of networks more efficient and resilient to
attacks and misconfigurations. Some paradigms of wireless multi-hop networks [1]
are: Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET), which are self-configured and dynamic net-
works with changing topology, Sensor Networks, which consist of low-power nodes
and are used for monitoring large buildings and agricultural areas and Vehicular
Ad-hoc Networks (VANET), which consist of vehicles moving rapidly in and out
of the network area. Another emerging paradigm of a wireless multi-hop network
is Machine-to-Machine (M2M) networks, which consists mainly from sensor nodes
and its operation is very similar to a sensor network. Most of these examples of
networks are parts of the Internet of Things (IoT), which is also considered as a
wireless multi-hop network with small connected devices (“things”).
This type of networks suffer from resource constraints, such as computation
1
power, battery power and memory limits. These resource limitations should be
taken into account when designing new protocols or proposing novel optimization
schemes. These networks are also vulnerable to different type of attacks, which
attempt to deplete the network resources and degrade the network performance.
In addition, energy preservation is of utmost importance for this type of networks.
In this dissertation, we propose novel schemes and methodologies from a practical
and a theoretical point of view in order to handle with problems under these two
different optimization criteria, security and energy efficiency.
1.1 Security Considerations in Wireless Multi-hop Networks
Over the past few years, several critical security issues have emerged, both in
commercial and civil infrastructure domain. Wireless multi-hop networks are being
used to deliver sensitive and critical data and are prone to attackers, because the
network nodes are designed to defend against different attacks. Hence, attackers are
capable of taking control of the network and releasing different type of attacks from
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to data integrity attacks, by dropping, modifying,
injecting or delaying various messages. These attacks lead to significant performance
degradation, because of modifications imposed by the adversaries in the benign
network operation, or leakage of sensitive private data.
In the first part of this dissertation, we propose lightweight, in terms of compu-
tation overhead, modifications on routing protocols and other network operations,
in particular cross-layer optimization, in order to mitigate the effect of different type
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of network attacks. We investigate the attacker landscape and the notion of trust,
which will be incorporated as a security and resiliency metric in this dissertation.
1.1.1 Attacker Landscape
Systems with distributed architecture, such as wireless multi-hop networks,
are prone to attackers. There are several types of attacks that are deployed in
wireless multi-hop networks with different objectives. The adversaries deploy their
attacks in several parts of the network and aim at degrading the availability and the
integrity of the network. The adversaries are intelligent and it is in general more
difficult to detect their misbehavior in comparison with traditional systems.
The different attackers can be classified as external or internal. External at-
tackers are not authenticated and do not possess the corresponding credentials (e.g.,
digital certificates) to be considered part of the network. Misbehavior of exter-
nal adversaries can be identified via traditional cryptographic techniques, such as
public-key based techniques (confidentiality) or message authentication codes (mes-
sage integrity) and can be excluded from the network.
On the other hand, internal attackers possess the required credentials to be
part of the network, but they are not following the protocol. These adversaries
release more sophisticated attacks, which are more difficult to be detected. They
manipulate control and data packets in order to cause disruption and degradation
of network performance. In this dissertation, we focus on mitigating the effect of
these internal network adversaries, or so called Byzantine adversaries, which behave
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as normal entities, but they modify the protocol’s operation. Some examples of
these internal Byzantine adversaries, which are presented in [2] and [3], are black-
hole/grayhole attacks, wormhole and selective forwarding attacks.
1.1.2 Notion and Benefits of Trust
Wireless multi-hop networks consist of devices with low computational power,
limited energy and memory. Hence, traditional cryptographic techniques are not
suitable for these paradigms of networks, because they create heavy computational
overhead. In addition, traditional cryptographic techniques cannot be used to detect
sophisticated internal adversaries, who possess the credentials to be part of the net-
work. To address the misbehavior of compromised nodes, we use the notion of trust
between the network entities. Trust represents a quantified relationship between
the network entities, based on some observations of neighbor entities’ behavior or
previous interactions. Trust values constitute a lightweight security metric, which
can be exploited to increase security and resiliency in the network. In addition,
trust values can also represent misconfigurations of failures in the network.
Several definitions for trust have been proposed in the literature. In [4] trust
denotes the entity’s opinion about the trustworthiness of a digital certificate is de-
fined as a continuous value in [0, 1]. A general theory of trust in networks that
consist of devices and humans is introduced in [5]. The authors distinguish the
trust in behavioral and computational and attempt to establish new trust relations,
in the case that humans participate actively in the network. One other definition of
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trust introduced in [6] incorporates the notion of confidence for our estimated trust
value of a network entity. Confidence indicates the accuracy of the trust estimation
for a particular entity.
Estimation of the trust values in different update periods is a crucial operation
and it can be performed using different approaches. One way is to deploy various
detectors as proposed in [7] to observe misbehavior of network entities. Other ap-
proaches for trust evaluation have been proposed in [8] and [9]. Trust values should
be periodically propagated in the network, in order to be used by the distant network
nodes. Theodorakopoulos and Baras in [6] proposed a semiring based framework,
which provides a robust mechanism for distribution of trust.
Finally, an advantage of using trust estimates is that they can be easily inte-
grated into system components to make them more resilient and secure compared
to traditional cryptographic methods. Hence, in our work, we utilize trust estimates
to enhance security in different protocol components.
1.1.3 Component-based Protocol Design
Component-based protocol design is a systems engineering approach [10] for
modeling and designing network protocols for wireless multi-hop networks. Network
protocols can be viewed as systems of systems and can be separated into components
based on their different functionalities. The distinct protocol components interact
with each other and exchange useful information related to the protocol procedure.
The methodology was first proposed by Baras et. al in [11] and [12]. A cross
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layer analysis of MAC and routing protocols, based on the idea of component-based
modeling, was also introduced in [13]. The method provides a systematic approach
that can be used in the design, performance analysis and optimization of network
protocols. The main objective of the approach is the separation of concerns between
the different components, which overlap as little as possible in functionality.
The component-based approach provides two major contributions in protocol
design and modeling. First, it allows modularity in protocol design. Routing proto-
cols are usually implemented as large monolithic software, which are very difficult
to adapt to varying environmental conditions. By using the component-based ap-
proach, we abstract the functionalities of the protocol into fundamental building
blocks and we can easily design and model each of these blocks to adapt to the
environmental changes. Furthermore, our approach allows reusability of existing
components across current and future protocols of the same class. The objective
is to create a library of components that can be easily plug into each protocol and
configure its functionality according to the environmental conditions to increase
the performance. The novel components should be designed in a way that allow
reusability with minor modifications. Minor modifications are needed based on the
implementation details of each network protocol.
In the second chapter of the dissertation, we take advantage of the component-
based approach to design novel modified protocol components, which mitigate the
effect of different types of attacks that cause significant network performance degra-
dation. We observed that different type of attacks affect significantly the perfor-
mance of specific protocol components. Hence, this approach provides localization
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of attacks to protocol components. As part of this dissertation, we utilize updated
trust estimates to design a set of lightweight mitigation techniques, which are incor-
porated into protocol components and lead to high performance recovery.
1.2 Energy Efficiency Considerations in Wireless Multi-hop Networks
Wireless multi-hop networks suffer from energy limits, because most of the
nodes in this type of networks are battery-powered and are not rechargeable. Hence,
a crucial limitation that we should take into account when designing new protocols
is the battery capabilities of the network.
In the second part of this dissertation, we propose novel energy efficient rout-
ing schemes for different types of wireless multi-hop networks. We investigate the
different sources of energy depletion in a network and propose efficient solutions
that incorporate sleep management and the introduction of novel routing metrics.
Sleep management enables nodes to be inactive in specific time periods that they
do not need to forward data packets. Routing metrics modify the route selection in
a multi-hop network. Our proposed solutions can be easily integrated to standard
routing protocols.
Finally, we deal with the energy-aware coverage problem in a sensor network.
Coverage is a crucial operation of wireless sensor networks, because sensor nodes
should configure appropriately their coverage area in order to optimize data collec-
tion. Data packets are then forwarded to the sink nodes of the sensor multi-hop
network. However, battery limitations of the deployed sensor nodes should be taken
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into account in the coverage problem. Therefore, we propose novel game-theoretic
coverage approach to capture the tradeoff between coverage and energy consump-
tion.
1.2.1 Energy Efficient Routing
Energy efficiency considerations should be taken into account when designing
and implementing new routing schemes for wireless multi-hop networks. There are
several causes of energy depletion during the routing procedure, such as transmit-
ting, receiving data packets, idle listening and overhearing. The proposed routing
schemes, which we investigate as part of this dissertation, aim at reducing energy
depletion through idle listening and overhearing and selecting more energy efficient
paths by introducing appropriate routing metrics. Hence, we focus on sleep man-
agement schemes and new energy efficient schemes that prolong network lifetime.
We define as network lifetime, the time until one node of the network is completely
depleted from energy. There are several other definitions for network lifetime that
we have not taken into account as part of this dissertation, such as the time un-
til a specific number of nodes is depleted from energy or the time until network
partitioning, because several nodes are depleted.
Sleep management schemes have been proposed in [14], [15], [16] and [17].
These schemes enable scheduling of the nodes in order to be active in specific periods
of time and hence save energy and extend network lifetime. Energy efficient routing
metrics have been proposed in [18], [19], [20], [21] and [22]. We will describe these
8
metrics in more details in the following chapters of this dissertation. These metrics
modify the routing procedure and enable more energy-aware selection of forwarding
paths.
1.2.2 Energy-Aware Sensor Coverage
Coverage is a crucial aspect of wireless sensor networks operation and is used
for efficiently monitoring large areas and collecting measurements. The sensor nodes,
which are used for collecting data, are battery-limited and consume significant en-
ergy in order to increase the efficiency of coverage. Therefore, sensor nodes aim at
maximizing a common utility function through efficient coverage, but at the same
time they should reduce the energy consumption.
Different approaches have been proposed to optimize sensor coverage prob-
lems As part of this dissertation, we mainly focus on game-theoretic approaches
introduced in [23], [24] and [25]. Moreover, there is a lot of interest to investigate
energy limitations for the sensor coverage problem. Some solutions that capture the
trade-off between efficient coverage and energy efficiency, which is the objective of
Chapter 6 of this dissertation, are presented in [26] and [27].
1.3 Contributions of the dissertation
In this dissertation, we introduce practical and theoretical schemes for secu-
rity and energy efficiency in resource-constrained wireless multi-hop networks. In
the beginning of the dissertation, we introduce a novel approach for secure and
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resilient protocol design inspired by the component-based protocol design method-
ology. This methodology allows us to separate network protocols into components
and introduces the notion of component-based security and resiliency by hardening
the individual components rather than the protocol itself. This approach is proved
to be more efficient than the related work, where protocols are created from the
beginning or modified in order to mitigate the effect of specific network attacks. We
have introduced a framework for mitigating the effect of different network attacks.
The framework contains a set of lightweight mitigation techniques that are associ-
ated with protocol components. These mitigation techniques utilize trust estimates
to change the functionality of each component and are highly reusable across pro-
tocols of the same class. We introduce and develop three mitigation techniques for
our framework, which we have integrated into standard proactive routing protocols,
and we illustrate through experimentation that they can achieve fast and high per-
formance recovery under different deployed attacks and environmental conditions.
In the following chapter, we introduce the notion of security into cross-layer
optimization problems (NUM problem) for wireless multi-hop networks. Our opti-
mization framework utilizes trust estimates as the security metric, in order to prevent
allocating data rate through untrusted paths consisting of compromised intermedi-
ate nodes. Trust estimates are introduced as soft constraints in the optimization
problem and affect the optimization process. We have also introduced delay con-
straints in the optimization problem, in order to address QoS requirements. Our
performance evaluation indicates that source rate is mainly allocated in the trusted
paths, but in the scenario that there is higher traffic demand the untrusted paths
10
should be utilized for data forwarding.
In the second part of the dissertation, we propose novel distributed sleep man-
agement techniques for heterogeneous wireless M2M networks to efficiently man-
age battery lifetime. Our network is heterogeneous in the sense that it consists of
battery-powered nodes (BPNs) and a low percent of mains-powered nodes (MPNs).
BPNs schedule variable length sleep intervals that start with an active period (AP),
followed by a sleep period (SP). BPNs decide the length of sleep intervals in a dis-
tributed manner based on their local data traffic, which consists of buffered packets,
self-generated packets, and prediction of incoming relay data traffic. For this pur-
pose, we introduce a model to estimate the number of incoming relay packets, in
which we take into account buffer overflow, channel uncertainty and probability of
the BPN being active. In addition, we have proposed an AP extension scheme, which
gives BPNs the flexibility to transmit or receive more data packets. We also intro-
duce two novel battery energy aware metrics: Battery Node Energy Waste (EW)
and Battery Node Relay Cost (RC). These two metrics are node related metrics and
take into account sleep management and different causes of energy depletion. They
aim to discover the best route that satisfies some battery related properties. We
have integrated our proposed scheme and routing metrics into a standard protocol
for M2M networks to show their applicability. Finally, we have illustrated through
extensive performance evaluation that our scheme achieves better performance than
the related work.
Furthermore, we propose a novel multiple metric routing scheme to be applied
in dynamic wireless multi-hop networks, such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET),
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and integrate it into a standard routing protocol for MANETs, called OLSR, to ex-
amine its effectiveness. We use a combination of routing metrics from multiple layers
and network topology to create a unified routing metric, which represents the cost
of a network node. These metrics are MAC queue utilization, residual energy and
node degree. For our experimentation, we create the Modified OLSR protocol, which
utilizes the novel multi-metric energy efficient scheme, and we examine its energy
behavior and its performance (in terms of network lifetime and PDR) compared to
the standard OLSR protocol. Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, we address
the energy-aware sensor coverage problem using a game-theoretic control approach.
We design a utility function that captures the trade-off between coverage efficiency
and energy consumption and we propose a distributed learning rule that enables
bit-valued communication between the different nodes (agents). In addition, we
analyze and prove the convergence of our approach to a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
1.4 Organization of the dissertation
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. The first two chapters ad-
dress security considerations in wireless multi-hop networks. We propose efficient
and lightweight solutions, which utilize trust estimates, to modify appropriately
network protocols and network optimization procedures and make them more re-
silient to network layer attacks. The last three chapters address energy preservation
considerations in this type of networks. We introduce novel techniques for energy
efficient routing and energy-aware sensor coverage.
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Chapter 2 contains our work on component-based reusable adaptive mitigation
techniques for network layer attacks. Inspired by the component-based protocol
design, we have proposed a set of mitigation techniques that use trust estimates
and could be reused across different protocols. We illustrate the efficiency of the
techniques in terms of performance recovery with experimental evaluation. This
work is presented in [28] and [29].
In Chapter 3, we describe our work on trust-aware network utility maximiza-
tion, which appeared in [30]. We enhance the cross-layer optimization technique
with trust metrics in order to mitigate the effect of malicious nodes across the dif-
ferent paths. We illustrate the effectiveness of our approach via simulations.
In Chapter 4, we describe our work on distributed sleep management for het-
erogeneous wireless machine-to-machine network, which appeared in [31]. We have
integrated the proposed solutions into a standard sensor network routing protocol
(i.e. RPL [32]) and conducted network simulations to show the efficiency of our
proposed scheme.
Chapter 5 presents our work on multi-metric energy efficient routing for dy-
namic ad-hoc networks. We have integrated the novel introduced routing metrics
into a standard ad-hoc routing protocol (i.e. OLSR [33]) and we have conducted
extensive simulations under static and various mobility scenarios to indicate the
effectiveness of our approach. This work appeared in [34].
In Chapter 6, we present our work on distributed energy-aware mobile sensor
coverage, which appeared in [35]. We formulate energy-aware sensor coverage as a
game theoretic control problem and we propose an algorithm that is proved to reach
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a Nash Equilibrium for the sensor coverage problem.
Finally, we conclude this dissertation and we present several directions for
future work in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
Component-based Mitigation of Attacks in Mobile Ad-hoc
Networks
2.1 Overview
Mobile ad-hoc networks are exposed to control layer attacks, which decrease
significantly their performance. Most of these attacks have tremendous impact on
the packet delivery ratio and the end-to-end latency, which are crucial performance
metrics for a wide range of applications. The motivation of our work is to design
efficient and lightweight schemes to mitigate the effect of the attacks and achieve
reasonable performance. The mitigation schemes should be easily applicable to
existing MAC and routing protocols in order to be used in a wide variety of networks.
The innovative idea in order to make the adaptive mitigation applicable to many
existing and future protocols is to identify some reusable protocol components, i.e.
fundamental building blocks of communication protocols. These reusable protocol
components are defined by the separate functionalities of the protocols and they
need to be general enough to include the instantiation of various protocols.
The different types of attacks do not affect in the same way the different
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components of the protocol, i.e. an attacker that selectively drops packets in the
data plane have a significant effect in the data forwarding component. Our objective
is to detect and modify the “weak” components with a set of mitigation techniques.
Mitigation techniques use reliability estimates as input, which are combinations
of trust and confidence (for the trust estimate) values. These estimates indicate
which nodes are compromised and what type of attacks have been deployed in
the network. The next incentive for the component-based approach is that we are
capable of embedding the mitigation techniques into specific protocol components,
which are activated appropriately when we detect a specific attack to adapt to
the environmental conditions. If we take it one step further we can claim that
the mitigated components can be used as fundamental building blocks in many
communication protocols without significant changes. There would only be some
protocol specific changes that should be done and it is a very small percentage of
the main protocol’s component. This increases maximum reusability across multiple
protocols and contributes to the design of new and more robust communication
protocols.
2.1.1 Related Work
In this subsection, we investigate the state of the art work on proposed mit-
igation techniques for wireless network protocols, as well as, the related work on
component-based protocol design methodologies.
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2.1.1.1 Mitigation techniques for network protocols
There are several mitigation techniques proposed for wireless network protocol
to resist against various types of attacks. In [3] the authors propose a new secure on-
demand routing protocol for ad-hoc networks, called ODSBR, which is proved to be
resilient against several Byzantine attacks. It uses an adaptive probing technique to
identify the malicious links and then it modifies the route discovery process based on
a metric that captures this adversarial behavior. A new secure routing protocol with
quality of service guarantees was proposed in [36]. This new protocol incorporates a
secure route discovery process and the addition of some trustworthiness-based QoS
routing metrics, which combine trust and QoS guarantees (packet delay and link
quality). Secure route discovery schemes that modify existing protocols have been
proposed in [37] for AODV [38], which is a reactive routing protocol, and in [39] for
OLSR routing protocol, which is a proactive routing protocol. In addition, in [40]
the authors introduce novel cross-layer routing metrics to mitigate the effect of self-
ish behavior (packet dropping attack). They illustrate the efficiency of the proposed
routing metrics by extensive performance evaluation using the ODBSR routing pro-
tocol. Secure message transmission (SMT) was introduced by Papadimitratos and
Hass in [41] to secure the data transmission process, by detecting and avoiding non-
operational or compromised routes. Finally, a new scheme for topology control that
creates k-connected networks was introduced in [42]. This scheme can adapt the
network topology in the case that our network is completely partitioned due to a
set of compromised nodes.
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Most of the prior art, described above, introduced new secure protocols or
protocol-specific mitigation techniques to defend against common network layer at-
tacks. However, the applicability of these techniques across a variety of existing
and future network-layer protocols is limited because they are not designed in a
reusable manner. A general methodology is therefore needed for modifications of
the behavior of different existing protocols based on the current network state and
detected threats.
2.1.1.2 Component-based design of network protocols
Component-based design of wireless routing protocols was first proposed by
Baras and He in [12]. In this work, the authors proposed a general decomposi-
tion of reactive routing protocols, such as AODV [38] and DSR [43] into four main
components, based on the different operations of this type of protocols: path discov-
ery, route maintenance, topology database maintenance and data packet forwarding
component. They also defined component related performance metrics and exam-
ined the effect of them in the overall performance metrics of this type of protocols. In
addition, they proposed a methodology to detect and replace the weak component,
i.e. the component that leads to significant performance degradation.
Baras et. al introduced a decomposition of proactive routing protocols in [11]
and used OLSR [33] as a case study. The authors proposed a decomposition of this
type of routing protocols into components and analyzed the operation of three of
the fundamental building blocks. In addition, they focused on the Neighborhood
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Discovery Component (NDC) and provided a methodology for design and modifica-
tion of this component that leads to a routing protocol with reliable performance.
The authors conducted performance analysis among the modified version of OLSR
with the proposed NDC component and the standard OLSR protocol.
A software framework called CONFab for component based optimization of
wireless sensor networks protocol stacks is proposed in [44]. The authors treated the
protocol stacks as a collection of interdependent configurable components. Based on
the scenario and the desired performance metrics the framework suggested suitable
protocol stacks and selection of parameters. It also took advantage of a deployment
feedback mechanism that uses knowledge of previous deployments of protocol stacks
(combined routing and MAC layer protocols) in order to select the protocol stack
to meet the performance requirements.
Furthermore, a component-based architecture for power-efficient MAC pro-
tocol development in wireless sensor networks, named MAC Layer Architecture
(MLA), is presented in [45]. The authors defined and implemented a set of fun-
damental components for MAC layer protocols in wireless sensor networks. These
components are optimized and reusable across different protocols as they implement
a set of common features shared by existing MAC protocols. The authors exam-
ined the flexibility of the architecture by implementing five well-known MAC layer
protocols using the defined reusable components. Performance evaluation showed
that these implementations have comparative performance with the monolithic im-
plementations of the same protocols. Finally, a declarative perspective on adaptable
extensible MANET protocols is presented in [46]. The authors proposed the con-
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struction of composite protocols using two mechanisms: policy-driven hybrid pro-
tocols and component-based routing. In component-based routing they presented
some initial thoughts of specifying declaratively common functionalities of routing
protocols as components that will be used across multiple protocols and will be
activated upon occurrence of certain events in the network.
2.1.2 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we present a novel methodology for secure and resilient pro-
tocol design using the component-based approach, which enables decomposition of
protocols of the same class into different components. The decomposition of the
network protocol allows us to analyze the individual components within protocols
and develop mitigation techniques associated with specific components rather than
with the entire protocol. Hence, we are capable of swapping components (without
built-in mitigation techniques) with the ones that have mitigation techniques built
into them, which we call mitigated components, to defend against different net-
work attacks. In addition, maximum reusability of these techniques can be achieved
among different protocols of the same class by creating a library of well-known
components of network-layer protocols. Thus, our objective is to develop a frame-
work that incorporates a set of reusable lightweight mitigation techniques, which
are applied to existing and future protocols and not to design completely new se-
cure protocols. Finally, our methodology enables localization of different attacks to
different components, because each attack aims at degrading the performance of a
20
specific protocol component. After localizing the weakest component, we activate
a mitigation technique associated with this component in order to recover network
performance.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• The design of component-specific mitigation techniques that harden the se-
lected network layer (e.g., routing) protocols against a wide range of attacks
and are reusable across protocols of the same class. These novel mitigation
techniques are lightweight, because they utilize trust estimates, and modify
the functionality of particular protocol component.
• Experimental validation of the effectiveness of the applied mitigation tech-
niques in terms of performance recovery.
We introduce three network layer mitigation techniques, which are presented
in [28] and [29]: trust-aware link weight adjustment (TALWA), redundant packet
forwarding (RPF) and neighbor discovery gatekeeper (NDG). These mitigation tech-
niques are incorporated into specific components of the network-layer protocol and
modify their behavior dynamically in response to severe attacks against the control
plane. The techniques are also tested to be highly reusable across different protocols
since the percentage of protocol specific code is very low. Our performance eval-
uation shows: (i) fast recovery against various attacks in the case where the most
efficient mitigation technique is selected and (ii) high recovery of throughput.
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2.1.3 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the soft relia-
bility (SR) estimates, which are utilized for the proposed techniques. We describe
our proposed proactive routing protocol decomposition in Section 2.3. We used
proactive routing protocol as the use case for our proposed system. In Section 2.4
we present the adversary models used in our analysis and experiments. We de-
scribe the newly designed component-based mitigation techniques in Section 2.5.
We examine the performance of the mitigation techniques in Section 2.6. Finally,
we conclude our work in Section 2.7.
2.2 Soft Reliability (SR) estimates
The proposed mitigation techniques utilize trust estimates to modify the func-
tionality and increase the resiliency of protocol components. By using trust esti-
mates we avoid the heavy cryptographic operations and we are also capable of de-
tecting misbehavior of authenticated malicious entities in the network. In addition,
by using the trust estimates we can capture additional misconfigurations or failures
in the network. Finally, trust estimates compared to cryptographic techniques can
be easily integrated in modular system design and used as an input to protocol
components.
In this chapter, we adopt the definition for trust introduced by Theodor-
akopoulos and Baras in [6], where we have multiple tuples of trust and confidence
values (t, c) for each network node. Trust values indicate the trustworthiness of an
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entity derived by the past observations and interactions of this entity with each of
its neighbors nodes. Confidence values indicate the accuracy of the trust value that
we have received for a particular entity. Both trust and confidence take numerical
values in the range [0, 1] and are updated and propagated to the network periodi-
cally. Higher trust value indicates that the corresponding entity is benign and higher
confidence value shows that the entity has passed a large number of tests or it had
a lot of interactions with its neighbor nodes in order to get an accurate trust value
estimate.
In this work, we have used a set of detectors, described in [7], which observe
behavior of network entities, in order to derive the trust values t of the neighbor
nodes in different update periods. The confidence values are associated with the
different detectors and indicate their accuracy (how “good” are the trust estimates).
Hence, in the case that we have high confidence, we should assign the nodes the
corresponding trust value close to the estimated trust value t, whereas in the scenario
that we obtain low confidence value, we should assign a lower trust value. To depict
the effect of the confidence value derived from the detectors to the assigned trust
values, we propose the combination of the trust and confidence values into one a
unified single metric, called soft reliability (SR) estimate. This metric takes value
in [0, 1] and it is close to the trust values only in the case that confidence value is
high (close to 1). Otherwise, soft reliability estimate is proportionally lower than
the derived trust values, based on the confidence values. Fig. 2.1 indicates how the
soft reliability (SR) estimates are derived from the tuples (t, c). These estimates
are used as an input for our proposed mitigation techniques and indicate whether a
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node is observed to be malicious or benign.
Figure 2.1: Soft Reliability (SR) estimates
2.3 Component-based Protocol Design Approach
Component-based protocol design is the centerpiece of our proposed solution.
As we discussed in the introduction of this dissertation this approach defines a
collection of elementary modules that can be combined to synthesize protocols with
various capabilities. Components are fundamental abstractions of the protocols
based on their distinct common functionalities. Hence, we are capable of designing
and implementing lightweight mitigation techniques, which can be integrated into
specific protocol components to modify appropriately their behavior against different
type of attacks. These techniques utilize the updated trust estimates and they
do not require heavy cryptographic operations. In addition, they can be easily
deployed and reused among different current and future routing protocols with minor
modifications.
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2.3.1 Decomposition of Proactive Routing Protocols
In this subsection, we propose a decomposition of proactive routing protocols
into components according to the protocol’s operations. Proactive routing protocols
is a class of routing protocols that constructs a priori the paths and therefore the
routing tables, based on topology information that is being disseminated periodi-
cally across the network. Examples of proactive routing protocols are OLSR [33],
DSDV [47] and BATMAN [48]. We decompose the protocol based on the different
functionalities of this class of routing protocols and formalize and define the inter-
actions between the separate components. This decomposition of proactive routing
protocol into components is presented in [49], [50] and is illustrated in Fig 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Decomposition of Proactive Routing Protocols
We describe the different components, their functionalities and the dependen-
cies between them:
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• Neighbor Discovery: Describes the operation of the routing protocol to dis-
cover its immediate neighbors, which have stable links. A performance model
for the neighbor discovery component (NDC) in proactive routing protocols is
described in [11] and [51]. The neighbor discovery, as we see in Fig 2.2, has
an immediate association with the topology database component, in order to
update the set of links stored in the topology database component.
• Topology Database: This component is responsible for storing the updated
topology information that will be used in the route selection. It has a direct
association with neighbor discovery component, route discovery and link moni-
tor. It takes from the neighbor discovery component the immediate neighbors
at each time and from the link monitor the information regarding the link
weights. It receives from the route discovery component the relay set that it
decides to advertise to the rest of the network and the links advertised from
the rest of the network to update appropriately the database. It stores all the
topology information for the mobile ad-hoc network at each time and each
node can create its routing tables in a proactive way, i.e. know the optimal
paths before a routing request is instantiated by the source node.
• Route Discovery: This component (RDC) is responsible for the selection of
topology to disseminate to the network. It uses information through topology
database component to find the set of links that the node is going to advertise
to the rest of the network through the advertisement disseminator component.
Thus, this component executes the pruning algorithms [52] in order to select
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the relay set. In the case of OLSR the route discovery component selects the
multi-point relays (MPR) of the node [53]. In addition, the route discovery
class of components receives the advertisements from the other nodes of the
network, process them and sends the updated information to the topology
database component. Therefore, at each time in a proactive routing protocol
that follows these functionalities, we have an updated topology database that
has the information about the advertised links and the link weights. This
information can been taken as an input to the route selection component to
construct the routing tables of the mobile node.
• Advertisement Disseminator: This component sends the topology control
packets to the rest of the nodes of the network. Topology control packets con-
tain the set of links that the node wants to advertise to the network to be used
for routing selection. It gets the information as an input from route discovery
component and it uses the data forwarding component to flood the packets to
the rest of the mobile network (through the relay set of the originator node).
It also receives the advertisements from the rest of the nodes and it sends it to
the route discovery component to process them and send updated information
to the topology database component.
• Route Selection: This component is responsible for selecting the route for
the specific source and destination pair. It takes as an input the updated
topology information and the adjusted routing metrics in order to decide the
route that it will choose. It uses some optimization framework or some online
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learning techniques in order to make the decision. The simplest example is
a minimization algorithm on the sum of weights among the set of possibles
paths.
• Routing Metrics: This component is adjusting the routing metrics for the
links according to the routing requirements and the environmental conditions.
• Data Forwarding: This component is crucial to forwarding packets to the
rest of the network. It stores the routing tables and therefore the least-cost
paths information. It is associated with four components: the route selection,
the advertisement disseminator, the link monitor and the neighbor discovery
component.
2.4 Adversary Models
In this section, we describe the classes of attacks that we attempt to miti-
gate with our proposed techniques. These attacks influence the functionality of the
protocol and affect its performance. Each of these attacks affects different compo-
nents of the protocol and we want to investigate which mitigation techniques are
more efficient against different attacks and environmental conditions (e.g. number
of compromised nodes).
There are two main classes of attacks: a) control plane and b) data plane
attacks. Control plane attacks aim at manipulating the control messages to disrupt
the network operation. Data plane attacks are related to packet forwarding. We in-
vestigate both classes of attacks and their impact on the routing protocol operation.
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The network-layer attacks that we have examined fall into three main categories
of control plane attacks: blackhole/greyhole attack, wormhole attack, and selfish
behavior in the control plane. We also implemented one data plane attack, i.e.,
the selfish behavior in the data plane, which is a type of selective data forwarding
attack. These attacks and some of their variations are described in [2] and [3].
2.4.1 Blackhole/Greyhole Attack
In this type of Byzantine attack, the malicious node manipulates the con-
trol plane packets by advertising false topology to attract data traffic. The adver-
sary falsely presents himself as the node with the closest proximity to the rest of
the nodes by modifying the corresponding control packets (data integrity attack).
The attracted traffic can be entirely (blackhole (BH)) or partially (greyhole) eaves-
dropped, dropped (availability attack), or manipulated. This leads to significant
decrease of packet delivery ratio (PDR) and throughput.
The application and impact of the attack differs across diverse routing types.
For reactive routing protocols (e.g., AODV, DSR), blackhole/greyhole type of at-
tacks are easier to deploy. Their effectiveness depends on the location of the node
with respect to the RREQ messages. For proactive protocols (e.g., OLSR, OSPF,
DSDV, BATMAN), this type of attacks is more challenging to implement due to
the use of the topology control (TC) or the link state messages. The effectiveness
of the attack in proactive protocols depends on the number of malicious nodes and
not on the node location.
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2.4.2 Wormhole Attack (Fake out-of-band communication links)
This attack requires colluding adversaries who use an out-of-band communi-
cation channel. The objective of the colluding adversaries is to advertise that they
are one-hop neighbors and influence the shortest path selection algorithm in order
to select the links between them as part of the shortest path between the source and
destination. This attack impacts the long distance traffic, which will attempt to use
this link, and causes packet drop, long end-to-end latency, and eavesdropping.
2.4.3 Packet Relays Attack (Man-in-the-Middle attack)
This attack is a wormhole type of attack, but does not require colluding adver-
saries. A single malicious node operates in stealth mode and forwards appropriately
modified relay control packets between a selected set of one-hop neighbors. When
the malicious node receives a HELLO message from any of the neighbors, it adds
the IP addresses of the rest of the neighbors and relays this HELLO message, so
that the 2-hop neighbors appear to be one-hop away. The behavior of the malicious
node will impact the 2-hop neighbors: although they are not directly connected, due
to the modified HELLO message received they think that they can communicate
with each other.
2.4.4 Selfish Node Behavior (Control Plane)
Selfish behavior (SB) attack, or otherwise defined as packet dropping or selec-
tive forwarding attack, on the control plane is an opportunistic attack that affects
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the control traffic that passes through the malicious nodes. In selfish behavior at-
tack, the adversary does not try to influence the path of the traffic flow, but just
affects the forwarding traffic. When a malicious node has to relay or send control
traffic, it drops the traffic deterministically or statistically depending on its objec-
tive. In the deterministic drop case, the attacker prunes existing and legitimate
links making them unusable. Depending on the location of the malicious node, the
network may be partitioned. During the statistical drop of control traffic, legitimate
links appear to be unstable, whereby causing multiple transient effects and influ-
encing the convergence and correct operation of the routing protocol. This attack
leads to an increase in end-to-end delay, because it modifies the routing procedure.
2.4.5 Selfish Node Behavior (Data Plane)
Selfish behavior (SB) attack, or otherwise defined as packet dropping or se-
lective forwarding attack, can also be launched in the data plane. In this case the
malicious node manipulates the data traffic by dropping the packets that it is sup-
posed to forward. This attack leads to the decrease of packet delivery ratio (PDR)
and throughput. The adversary can deploy deterministic or statistical packets drops
based on her objective. Specifically, in the deterministic case the adversary drops
all the traffic so that it can cause high packet losses. However, if there is some mon-
itoring mechanism observing the adversary’s behavior, then is straightforward to
determine that such an attack is being deployed. On the other hand, the objective
of a statistical selfish behavior attack is to cause high packet loss but remain unde-
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tected. Hence, in this type of attack a compromised node drops the packets to be
forwarded in a probabilistic manner, making the detection much more challenging.
2.5 Network Layer Mitigation Techniques
In our framework, we consider multiple control-plane attacks against various
network and link layer protocols, which degrade the network performance. Our
objective is to develop a set of component-based mitigation techniques to thwart
these attacks. In this section, we propose three mitigation techniques: trust-aware
link weight adjustment (TALWA), redundant packet forwarding (RPF) and neighbor
discovery gatekeeper (NDG). Table 2.1 illustrates the association of our proposed
mitigation techniques and other possible mitigation techniques, inspired from prior
work, that could be used from our system.
2.5.1 Trust-Aware Link Weight Adjustment
The trust-aware link weight adjustment (TALWA) is associated with the rout-
ing metrics components and adjusts the link weights for link-state routing protocols
such that the most trusted paths are utilized when the network is under attack
and the standard shortest paths are used in the benign state. The routing metrics
component obtains trust and confidence values, which are then converted into a
single soft reliability value. This mitigation technique is designed and implemented
without modifying the shortest path mechanism of routing and can be transparently
switched on and off without restarting a routing protocol instance. A similar idea
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Table 2.1: Mitigation techniques for protocol components
Protocol Component Mitigation Techniques
Neighbor Discovery Neighbor Discovery Gatekeeper (NDG)
Route Discovery Randomized route request forwarding [37]
k-robust relay set selection [39]
Route Selection Trusted Routing [54]
Routing Metrics Trust-Aware Link Weight Adjustment (TALWA)
Cross layer routing metrics [40]
Topology Database Reputation-Based Games [42]
Data Forwarding Secure Message transmission [41]
Redundant Packet Forwarding (RPF)
for trusted routing was presented in [54].
As shown in Fig. 2.3, TALWA mitigation technique adjusts the weights on
the links based on the soft reliability (SR) metric of neighbors in order to route
around compromised nodes while ensuring that the weight assignment results in
loop-free routes. To prevent significant variation of the soft reliability metric SRi
of node i and to include memory of the evaluation, we suggest using an exponential
weighted moving average (EWMA) [55] to update the link weights as a function of
the previous and the most updated reliability metric (RC) estimate. The update
formula of the weight wi,j for a node i and its link its neighbor j is defined as follows
wi,j = (1− α) ∗
1
SRj,prev




where α ∈ [0, 1] is a constant weight indicating the relative preference between the
updated and historic samples of soft reliability metric of the neighbor node j.
Figure 2.3: TALWA Example
The loop-free property is achieved because the above weight adjustment is
isotonic [56]. If we add a third path C to two paths (A, B), the relative cost of
the two new paths (A + C, B + C) maintains the relative cost of the initial (A, B)
paths. Currently, TALWA mitigation technique uses the soft reliability (SR) metric
of neighbors to find an alternative path.
TALWA is designed and implemented in a component-based framework, which
ensures high reusability of the mitigation among different routing protocols. TALWA
passes the adjusted links weights directly to the routing metrics component of a
routing protocol. These metrics are then used to select routes based on the standard
shortest-path calculation. We have implemented and integrated TALWA mitigation
in OLSR and BATMAN routing protocols with high reusability.
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2.5.2 Redundant Packet Forwarding (RPF)
Redundant packet forwarding (RPF) is associated with the data forwarding
component and is only activated for low-throughput and high-priority traffic, which
allows differentiating a response to attacks depending on data priorities. The RPF
mitigation technique is designed to work with single-path routing protocols. By
taking advantage of path diversity, the RPF clones a packet and sends the copy via
a secondary neighbor if the primary neighbor is estimated as unreliable. To select
the secondary neighbor the current algorithm computes the end-to-end reliability
cost of the path of each secondary neighbor to the destination and combines it with
the original cost. The end-to-end reliability cost (RC) and the total cost of the path




SRi, ∀pj ∈ P (2.1)
Total Costj = Original Costj ∗ (1 + 10 ∗RCj), ∀pj ∈ P (2.2)
After computing the costs, RPF selects as secondary neighbor the one with
the lowest total path cost to the destination. The cloning process is activated along
the end-to-end routing path at the first node with observed unreliable primary next
hop. However, a packet may be cloned at multiple intermediate nodes on its way
to destination in the case where the intermediate next-hops along the data path are
unreliable.
The RPF mitigation technique is designed and implemented in a component-
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based framework, which ensures high reusability of the mitigation among different
routing protocols. It runs as part of the data forwarding component. It applies
lightweight control actions that do not involve packet encapsulation or modifications
to the routing protocol. However, RPF mitigation introduces significant overhead
due to the packet cloning process. Hence, in order to reduce overhead, the RPF
also contains the redundancy elimination (RE) module. Since multiple copies of a
packet may be in transit, a cloned packet is dropped by RE if the original is also
observed at the same node.
2.5.3 Neighbor Discovery Gatekeeper
The goal with this mitigation is the implementation of an external Neighbor
Discovery Gatekeeper that interacts with the neighbor discovery component in or-
der to exclude from the neighbor table, the compromised neighbor nodes. It uses
the soft reliability metrics (SR) of the neighbor nodes, which as we described are a
combination of their (t, c) values, in order to decide which neighbors are compro-
mised and drop the HELLO messages originating from them. Thus, it executes a
filtering operation on the standard neighbor discovery component. The mitigated
component also utilizes hysteresis in order to cope with noisy reliability estimates.
In this way, it takes into account the transition phase in the reliability metrics of
the node between the Benign and the Malicious state, which are defined by some
threshold of the SR estimates. These states are used in order to exclude neighbor
nodes from the neighbor discovery procedure. This mitigation technique interacts
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with the neighbor discovery component of the routing protocol to excludes nodes
that are characterized as malicious from the topology database.
By applying the mitigated component for neighbor discovery we observe in the
performance evaluation section (Section 2.6) that we achieve significant performance
improvement in the case of a severe attack, such as Blackhole attack, where the
compromised node advertises itself as being the immediate neighbor of all nodes
of the network. Finally, this mitigated component is highly reusable and can be
integrated into most existing neighbor discovery protocols with minor modifications.
2.6 Performance Evaluation
We used the Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) [57] as our evalu-
ation environment for network layer mitigations techniques. CORE is a tool for
emulating networks on one or more machines. It consists of a GUI for drawing
topologies of lightweight virtual machines, and python modules for creating scripts
for network emulation. It also allows running unmodified applications and network
protocol software since each virtual machine provides a full network stack. Hence,
we are capable of using real protocols rather than simulation models to examine
the performance of our solutions. We also used MGEN [58], which is a tool that
generates real-time traffic patterns for the network, in order to conduct experiments.
The tool supports both TCP and UDP test traffic scenarios, but for the purpose of
our experimentation we have mainly used UDP traffic.
We have used real routing protocols for experimentation and evaluation. The
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different mitigated techniques are initially implemented using OLSR as a case study.
We have implemented and evaluated some of them to other proactive routing pro-
tocols, such as BATMAN, to indicate the high reusability of our solutions.
2.6.1 Performance evaluation of mitigation techniques
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the individual mitigation
technique introduced in this chapter. We show the effectiveness of these techniques
under different scenarios and under different types of attacks.
2.6.1.1 Trust-Aware Link Weight Adjustment (TALWA)
The trust-aware link weight adjustment (TALWA) mitigation is shown to be
effective when there are alternative trusted (reliable) paths with enough capacity
to carry all the traffic from the original (unreliable) path. In this case, the routing
metrics adjustment with the TALWA mitigation leads to the total recovery of packet
delivery ratio (PDR) and throughput in our scenario. We consider the 9-node topol-
ogy shown in Fig. 2.4, where there are a lot of compromised nodes deploying selfish
behavior attack in data plane (indicated by selfish nodes (SN)). In this scenario the
source node with IP address 10.0.0.1 sends UDP traffic to the destination node
with IP address 10.0.0.4 with rate 41 Kbps, but we observe significant decrease of
the throughput due to the selfish nodes (SN) attacks deployed by the intermediate
nodes. After activating TALWA in the source node and one intermediate node, we
notice in Fig. 2.5 that the traffic is redirected to the trusted path.
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Figure 2.4: Original Scenario for TALWA
Figure 2.5: Scenario after Mitigation
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We also observe in Fig. 2.6 that our system achieves almost total recovery of
the throughput after activating the TALWA mitigation technique, which indicates
the effectiveness of the mitigated component for scenarios that there is diversity of
paths in the network and there are alternative trusted paths.
We have also integrated TALWA into BATMAN routing protocol with minor
modifications, which indicates the reusability of our proposed technique. It also
achieved high performance recovery in a few seconds in the presence of multiple
selfish behavior node attacks in the network.
Figure 2.6: Throughput Recovery using TALWA
2.6.1.2 Redundant Packet Forwarding (RPF)
For the performance evaluation of RPF, we consider the 9-node topology shown
in Fig. 2.7 that includes three compromised nodes (indicated by SN), along all the
possible paths. The source node with IP address 10.0.0.1 sends UDP traffic to the
destination node with IP address 10.0.0.4 with rate 1 Kbps. The compromised
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intermediate nodes selfishly drop packets in the data plane (selfish behavior attack)
with dropping probability equal to 0.5.
Figure 2.7: RPF Mitigation Scenario
We activate the RPF at the intermediate nodes along the data path to clone
data packets on the most trusted alternative routes in order to recover throughput.
In the beginning, we activate the RPF in one intermediate node and we observe
partial performance recovery and then we activate RPF in a second intermediate
node, creating three clones of the initial traffic flow, which leads to almost full
recovery of throughput. The results are shown in Fig. 2.8.
2.6.1.3 Neighbor Discovery Gatekeeper (NDG)
To evaluate the performance of the NDG mitigation technique, we used a 9-
node topology with one traffic flow. The source node with IP address 10.0.0.1
sends UDP traffic to the destination node with IP address 10.0.0.4 with rate 41
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Figure 2.8: Throughput Recovery using RPF
Kbps. In the scenario shown in Fig. 2.9, there are two compromised nodes that
launch the combined blackhole and selfish behavior attacks. In the first stage of
the attack the malicious nodes deploy blackhole attack (BH) to attract the network
traffic and then they release a selfish behavior attack (SN) to actively drop data
packets and degrade network performance.
Figure 2.9: NDG Scenario-Combined Blackhole and Selfish Node Attackers
After the ND Gatekeeper mitigation is activated in some of the intermediate
nodes of the network, it starts discarding HELLO messages from the malicious nodes
(based on the soft reliability (SR) estimates). As a result, these nodes are prevented
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from forming routing adjacencies with other nodes. We show the efficiency of this
technique against severe attacks in Fig. 2.10. In the beginning there is a small
decrease of throughput due to the blackhole attack (BH), then we observe a signifi-
cant decrease to to the severe deployed selfish behavior attack (SN). After activating
NDG mitigation technique, the throughput is quickly restored in 20 seconds.
Figure 2.10: Throughput Recovery using NDG
The ND Gatekeeper is an aggressive, but efficient mitigation technique that
relies on the exclusion of malicious nodes from the routing procedure. The perfor-
mance evaluation of this mitigation technique shows the effectiveness against severe
attacks that manipulate control traffic, such as blackhole/greyhole attacks and their
combinations.
2.6.2 Efficiency of individual mitigation techniques
In this subsection, we examine the efficiency of the three proposed lightweight
mitigation techniques based on our performance evaluation results. The mitigation
techniques have different effect in the presence of different attacks and environmental
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conditions (e.g. path diversity). Table 2.2 summarizes the effect of the different pro-
posed mitigation techniques against different types of attacks and different number
of compromised nodes (network state). As we notice from the performance evalua-
tion section TALWA mitigation is effective in less severe attacks and the Neighbor
Discovery Gatekeeper mitigation is effective against more severe attacks that also
intervene in control plane and cause routing instabilities.
Table 2.2: Efficiency of different mitigation techniques
Attack Type Network Severity Effective
State Mitigation
Blackhole All neighbors Difficult to Recover Neighbor Discovery
Compromised GateKeeper
Selfish Node Subset of neighbors Easy to Recover Trust-Aware Link Weight
Data Plane Compromised Adjustment
Selfish Node All neighbors Difficult to Recover Redundant Packet
Data Plane Compromised Forwarding
We use OLSR routing protocol as the case study to implement the mitigation
techniques and examine their performance, but we have also implemented some
of the mitigation techniques in BATMAN routing protocol in order to show that
our mitigation techniques are reusable across different existing protocols. Based
on our implementation, the amount of code that is related to a specific routing
protocol and needs to be changed for a mitigated component is very low. Therefore,
the mitigated components are highly reusable across multiple protocols of the same
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class. In Table 2.3 we indicate the implemented mitigation techniques, the associated
component that they modify, and the amount of code that can be reused across
different protocols of the same class, based on the results that we got from the
implementation using the OLSR routing protocol.
Table 2.3: Reusability of mitigation techniques
Mitigation technique Component Code reuse
TALWA Routing Metrics 1998 / 2070 (96.5%)
RPF Data Forwarding 3565 / 3780 (94%)
NDG Neighbor Discovery 3200 / 3260 (98%)
We observe from Table 2.3 that our mitigated components are high reusable
across different protocols. To enhance our claim, we have also integrated TALWA
into BATMAN routing protocol. The mitigated component has similar effect in
the throughput recovery when we use BATMAN routing protocol and the proto-
col specific changes are 1.6% (23/1399) of the protocol code, which indicates high
reusability.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for mitigating control and data
plane attacks against wireless network protocols. The system takes advantage of the
component-based protocol design to change the protocol functionality in a modular
way in response to a variety of attacks. We have proposed a set of mitigation tech-
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niques, which are incorporated into protocol components, and utilize trust estimates
to modify component’s functionality. The implemented mitigation techniques are
lightweight and highly reusable across different protocols of the same class. The
performance evaluation of these techniques indicates high performance recovery in
different attack scenarios. As part of the future work, we will develop new mitigation
techniques in order to create a library of mitigated components that can be used
from our system. In addition, we will investigate the design of a component acti-
vation engine, which will enable the automatic activation of mitigation techniques
from our library of mitigated components depending on the network state. We have
described the operation of the engine as part of our future work in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 3
Trust-Aware Network Utility Optimization with Delay Con-
straints
In the previous chapter, we investigated the problem of utilizing trust esti-
mates (called soft reliability metrics) to develop a set of efficient and lightweight
mitigation techniques, which can be easily integrated to existing and future proto-
col components. In this chapter, we utilize the trust estimates to develop a unified
framework for resilient cross-layer optimization that aims at secure resource allo-
cation in wireless multi-hop networks. Our optimization framework captures the
tradeoff between security, network performance and delay requirements, which are
introduced via soft optimization constraints.
3.1 Overview
The problem of resource allocation in wireless networks has been a growing
area of research over the past decade. Recent advances in the area of network utility
maximization (NUM) driven cross-layer design [59], [60], [61] have led to efforts on
top-down development of next generation wireless network architectures. By linking
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decomposition of the NUM problem to different layers of the network stack, we are
able to design protocols, based on the optimal NUM derived algorithms, which
provide much better performance gain over the current network protocols.
Traditionally, network protocols are strictly layered. Source rate control, rout-
ing and scheduling (e.g. back-pressure scheduling [62]) are implemented indepen-
dently at different layers. In order to achieve high performance and efficient resource
utilization, these protocols should be jointly designed while the layered structure is
preserved. However, the nature of wireless multihop networks imposes new chal-
lenges to this cross-layer design, since the wireless channel is a shared medium where
the transmissions of users interfere with each other. The channel capacity is “elastic”
(time-varying) and the contention over such shared and limited network resources
provides a fundamental constraint for resource allocation. All these challenges cause
interdependencies across users and network layers. In spite of these difficulties, there
have been significant developments in optimization-based approaches that result in
loosely coupled cross-layer solutions [63].
In recent years, network security has become increasingly important in the
context of wireless multihop networks. Different types of network attacks can be
released and affect significantly their performance. In our work, we consider that
the adversary is capable of releasing some form of denial of service (DoS) attack.
Hence, without proper security consideration, the network operation is possible to
be disrupted. To capture the notion of security, we use “trust weights” [6] in the
network utility optimization process. These weights indicate whether a network
entity (node) is malicious or not, based on its interactions with the other network
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entities. Thus, by using them, we enhance the correct operation of the network and
its resilience to attacks. The trust weights are developed by our network community
based on monitoring and are disseminated via efficient methods so that they are
timely available to all nodes that need them [64].
End-to-end delay is a critical quality of service (QoS) requirement for resource-
constrained wireless networks. Network applications, served from different traffic
flows in the wireless network, have different delay requirements. For example, video
streaming applications are time-critical and have strict delay requirements. Hence,
it is crucial to take into account these delay constraints, corresponding to different
classes of traffic flows, to our trust-aware NUM problem.
3.1.1 Related Work
Network utility maximization (NUM) problems have been investigated widely
during recent years. Most of works [59], [60], [61], [63] focus on using NUM for
cross-layer optimization. Chiang et. al [59] introduced a methodology for opti-
mizing functional modules of the network, such as congestion control, routing and
scheduling, through optimization decomposition. Chen et. al [60] proposed a sub-
gradient algorithm for cross-layer optimization and its extension to time-varying
channels and adaptive multi-rate devices. The proposed solution in most of these
works depends on the decomposition of the dual function to different subproblems.
Decomposition methods for NUM problem are proposed in [65].
Several works have introduced delay considerations for the traffic flows into
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the NUM problem formulation. Trichakis et. al [66] proposed a dynamic NUM
formulation with delivery contracts for the different traffic flows. Delivery contracts
ensure that some quantity of a traffic flow will be delivered during a time interval.
One other concept for delay, used for the NUM problem, is the link capacity margins,
which we use in our work. These margins were introduced in [67] and [68] to control
the average end-end delay. Link margins represent the estimated delay of the link,
because higher link margin indicates lower link congestion and thus less delay.
As far as we are concerned, there are not a lot of works that relate security
with the NUM problem [69], [70]. Tague et. al [70] proposed a jamming-aware
throughput maximization approach. The authors estimate the effect of jamming on
packet delivery ratio. Then, they use these jamming estimates in the NUM problem
to allocate data traffic appropriately in order to achieve throughput maximization.
They adopt an objective function, based on portfolio selection theory to maximize
throughput for the different source nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study trust-aware network
utility maximization problems. Trust values affect the outcome of the NUM process
and make it resilient to malicious nodes’ behavior.
3.1.2 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of security into a cross-layer optimiza-
tion problem (NUM problem), by using the trust values of the network nodes. To
the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first initiatives on introducing security in
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optimization problems and it is the first step towards creating a unified optimization
framework that ensures security and resiliency.
Our optimization framework assigns to the users higher utility, when they relay
packets though trusted paths. Hence, our proposed trust-aware NUM process en-
sures that untrusted paths (with malicious entities) do not receive high traffic rate.
This is achieved by using the trust estimated incorporated into soft constraints of
the optimization problem and not by introducing rules (binary constraints) that
most of the prior work utilize to exclude malicious nodes from the network opera-
tion. We also add end-to-end delay constraints in the NUM problem based on [67].
These delay constraints indicate the QoS requirements of the different traffic flows.
The notion of link capacity margin [67] is used to control the end-to-end delay.
Finally, we propose a distributed cross-layer optimization algorithm for the trust-
aware NUM problem with delay constraints. The distributed algorithm is based on
the dual decomposition into source rate control, average end-to-end delay control
and scheduling subproblems.
3.1.3 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the system model
that we consider in this work, including the network model, the adversary model,
the trust values estimation, and the interference model. Section 3.3 outlines the
optimization constraints, which include link capacity, average end-to-end delay, and
scheduling constraints, as well as the primal optimization problem. The dual func-
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tion and its decomposition into different subproblems is studied in Section 3.4. Sec-
tion 3.4.4 discusses the distributed algorithm for solving the network utility maxi-
mization (NUM) problem. The simulation results for our proposed trust-aware NUM
problem with delay constraints are shown in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes this
chapter and discusses future work.
3.2 System Model
3.2.1 Network Model
We consider a multihop wireless network that can be defined by a graph
G(N ,L). The vertex set N represents the wireless network nodes. The edge set L
represents the wireless links. An ordered pair of nodes (i, j) belongs to the edge set
L if and only if node j can receive data packets directly from node i. For simplicity,
we also use the symbol ` to denote a wireless link. We assume that all node-to-node
communication is unicast, i.e. each packet transmitted by a node i ∈ N is intended
for a unique j ∈ N with (i, j) ∈ L. Each of the wireless links has a maximum
capacity denoted by ci,j. The interference constraints among transmission links will
be described in a later subsection.
There is a set F of network traffic flows that share the wireless network re-
sources and each flow f ∈ F is associated with a source node s. Each source node
s in a subset S ⊆ N generates data packets for a single destination node ds ∈ N .
We assume that each source node s constructs multiple routing paths with multiple
hops to ds in order to distribute the traffic demand and satisfy the flow related QoS
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Figure 3.1: Network with two alternative paths for traffic flow from s to d.
requirements. We denote as Ps = {ps1, . . . , psPs} the collection of the alternative
paths Ps that can be used to route packets from s to ds. Each path psk ∈ Ps is
specified by a subset of wireless links and is assumed to be loop-free. An example
of two different paths ps1 and ps2 from s to ds is shown in Figure 3.1, where
ps1 = {(s, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, ds)}
ps2 = {(s, 1), (1, 4), (4, 5), (5, ds)}
Let xs denote the Ps × 1 traffic rate vector with which data packets are sent from
s to ds over multiple paths psk ∈ Ps, and multiple hops. Each component of the
vector xsk denotes the proportion of traffic rate allocated to the corresponding path
psk, which routes data packets from source node s to destination ds. The total data
rate of the source s is given by the summation of xsk over k = 1, . . . , Ps.
We assume that the traffic rate vector xs of each flow is constrained to a
non-negative orthant. The traffic rate allocated to each traffic flow should also not
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exceed a maximum data rateRs. Therefore, each of the traffic rate vectors xs should
satisfy the following constraints
xs ≥ 0 ,∀s ∈ S (3.1)
1Txs ≤ Rs ,∀s ∈ S (3.2)
In Eq. (3.1) each component of the vector is nonnegative. These constraints define
the convex set Xs of feasible traffic rate vectors xs for source node s.
We denote by Rs = [(Rs)k(i,j)](Ps×|L|) the routing matrix that indicates the
different paths from source node s to destination ds. Element (Rs)k(i,j) of the routing
matrix is defined as follows
(Rs)k(i,j) =

1, if psk passes through link (i, j).
0, otherwise.
(3.3)
3.2.2 Security Considerations: Adversary Model and Trust
In this chapter, we study the network utility optimization problem with consid-
erations of network security. All previous works on the network utility maximization
(NUM) problems assume that nodes operate correctly. For example, intermediate
nodes successfully forward all packets, and they follow the routing and scheduling
protocols. However, nodes do not always function correctly in reality. They may
be compromised by attackers, their communication may be blocked or interfered by
attackers, or they may just be misconfigured. Wireless networks are especially vul-
nerable to attacks because of the inherent properties of the shared wireless medium.
Therefore, we believe it is crucial to take the security aspect into consideration in the
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NUM problems. We are going to define the adversary model, which describes the
capabilities of an adversarial node, and the notion of trust, which indicates whether
a node can be considered as trustworthy based on its observed behavior.
Adversary Model: We assume that the adversarial node is not following the
network protocol and attempts to disrupt communication by dropping or modifying
data packets. In this work, we mainly consider that the adversary is capable of
dropping data packets in a deterministic or probabilistic way (selective forwarding
attack). This type of attack leads to lack of availability of the network and con-
stitutes a denial of service (DoS) attack. The DoS attack affects significantly some
QoS requirements, such as end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio. Thus, in
order to support time-critical applications, the traffic allocation mechanisms should
be resilient to these types of attacks. In general, the notion of trust can also address
different types of attacks, such as the modification or fabrication of data messages.
In this case, trust evaluation should incorporate authentication or inspection (fil-
tering) mechanisms (e.g. Message Authentication Codes (MAC) or Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) [71]) at the receiver and intermediate nodes, in order to define the
trustworthiness of a network node.
Trust Estimates: The concept of security, which we adopt to distinguish
misbehaving nodes in this work is trust. Trust is a very critical concept not only in
communication networks, but also in various other networks that involve intelligent
decisions, such as social networks. All the connections and communications in these
networks imply the existence of trust. Trust integrates with several components of
network management, such as risk management, access control and authentication.
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Trust management is to collect, analyze and present trust related evidence and
to make assessments and decisions regarding trust relationships between entities in
a network [72]. The collection of trust evidence and the decision of trust are beyond
the scope of this work. We assume that there are mechanisms to efficiently distribute
trust evidence, such that duplicates of evidence documents are stored in places where
they are most needed. Different approaches of trust evidence distribution could be
found in [73] and [74] (use of network coding to efficiently distribute trust credentials
among network entities). Once the trust evidence is in hand, nodes could evaluate
the trustworthiness of other nodes. For instance, in wireless environments, the
monitoring mechanisms can help detect the behaviors of neighboring nodes and thus
infer their trust values [64]. We define the trust estimated value (or trustworthiness)
of node i as νi.
There are various ways to represent trust values νi numerically. In different
trust schemes, continuous or discrete numerical values are assigned to measure the
level of trustworthiness for a network entity. For example, in [4] the entity’s opinion
about the trustworthiness of a digital certificate is defined as a continuous value in
[0, 1]. Using the same logic for our definition of trust, we denote that it takes a
continuous numerical value in [0, 1].
We define an update period of the trust estimates denoted by Tupdate. During
the update period, represented by the time interval [t−Tupdate, t], the trust evaluation
mechanism provides fresh estimates of the trust values for nodes i ∈ S, based on
the interaction between network entities. Each node evaluates trust estimates for
its neighbor nodes and then the trust mechanism propagates the trust estimates
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throughout the network. Hence, at the time that we need to transmit data packets,
we use the trust estimates derived at the latest update period.
In order to prevent significant variation in the trust estimate νi of node i and to
include memory of the trust evaluation, we suggest using an exponential weighted
moving average (EWMA) [55] to update the trust estimate as a function of the
previous estimate, as indicated in [70]. Hence, the trust value of node i at time t is
given by
νi(t) = (1− α)νi(t− Tupdate) + ανnewi , (3.4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a constant weight indicating the relative preference between
updated and historic samples of trust values and νnewi is the fresh estimate of trust
value for node i, given from the trust evaluation mechanism.
Given the trust values for the intermediate nodes across a path psk, the source
node s evaluates the updated aggregate trust value for the path psk ∈ Ps. The
aggregate trust value of the path psk is denoted by tsk and can be expressed as the





Source nodes evaluate the aggregate trust values for their alternative routing paths
to destination ds, in order to determine the optimal traffic allocation among the
different paths.
One additional parameter that we should consider in the data traffic allocation
process is path reliability [75]. In our work, path reliability is indicated by the corre-
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sponding aggregate trust value tsk over the path psk, which denotes the proportion
of the allocated traffic flow that is actually received at destination node ds. Hence,
in order to maintain the reliability of the network the received traffic rate for each
traffic flow should exceed a certain threshold. We denote this threshold for each
source node s as Rthress , which is proportional to the maximum allowable rate Rs.




tskxsk ≥ Rthress , ∀s ∈ S (3.6)
The convex set Xs of feasible traffic rate vectors for source node s should also satisfy
the above reliability constraint.
3.2.3 Interference model and capacity region
In this subsection, we describe the interference model and the feasible capacity
region. In order to model interference among wireless links of our original wireless
multihop network, we use the concept of the conflict graph introduced in [76]. The
conflict graph captures the contention relations among the links. Each vertex in
the conflict graph indicates a wireless link and each edge indicates the interference
between the two corresponding links.
We can detect all the independent sets of vertices in the conflict graph. We
denote an independent set of links by e. The independent set e can be represented
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as a |L| × 1 capacity vector re. The element rei,j is expressed as
rei,j =

ci,j, , if (i, j) ∈ e.
0 , otherwise.
(3.7)
The links that belong in an independent set do not interfere and are allowed to
transmit simultaneously. The feasible capacity region Λ [60] is defined as the convex
hull of these capacity vectors and is expressed as
Λ =
{










Hence, the scheduling constraint indicates that the allocated capacity vector
from the scheduling process, denoted by ĉ, should satisfy ĉ ∈ Λ.
3.3 Network Utility Maximization (NUM) Formulation
In this section, we present the optimization framework for trust-aware network
utility maximization (NUM), in the case that the network nodes have an updated
estimate of trust values. We first develop a set of constraints imposed to our utility
optimization problem. These constraints are related to capacity of wireless links,
average end-to-end delay and scheduling. Then, we formulate the trust-aware utility
optimization problem, which gives an optimal solution to the traffic flow allocation
problem.
3.3.1 Optimization Constraints
Link Capacity constraint: To define capacity constraints we first intro-
duce the link capacity margin optimization variables, which were initially introduced
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in [67] and [68], in order to capture the imposed delay constraints. We denote by
σi,j or simply σ`, the link capacity margin of link (i, j) ∈ L. Link capacity margin
is defined as the difference between scheduled (allocated) capacity of a wireless link
and the maximum allowable traffic flow passing though it. Link capacity margin is
used to control link delay and therefore the average end-to-end delay.
We also need to take into account our trust estimates for the capacity con-
straints of each link (i, j) ∈ L. Based on the capabilities of the malicious nodes,
described in Section 3.2.2, the initially allocated traffic rate xsk can be significantly
reduced at malicious intermediate nodes because of dropping attacks. The decrease
of the traffic rate is proportional to the aggregate trust value of the selected path.
To be more specific, the decrease of the rate observed at an intermediate node is
proportional to the aggregate trust value up to this intermediate node. Let p
(i,j)
sk
denote the sub-path of psk from source node s to the intermediate node j through
link (i, j) ∈ psk. Then the traffic rate forwarded by intermediate node j ∈ N is
computed by t
(i,j)
sk xsk, where t
(i,j)
sk is evaluated as the product of trust estimates over
the sub-path p
(i,j)
sk , given by Eq. (3.5).








sk xsk ≤ ĉi,j − σi,j, ∀(i, j) ∈ L, (3.9)
where ĉi,j is the capacity allocated to the wireless link (i, j) ∈ L.
To define the different sub-paths’ aggregate trust values, we denote by Ts the
Ps × |L| aggregate trust incidence matrix for source s, with rows indexed by the
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alternative paths psk and columns indexed by links (i, j). If a link (i, j) does not
belong to any of the possible paths psk for source s, then the corresponding entry
of the incidence matrix is equal to 0. The element t(psk, (i, j)) or otherwise t
(i,j)
sk
for row psk and column (i, j) of Ts denotes the aggregate trust value of a possible
sub-path p
(i,j)
sk of path psk and is given by
t(psk, (i, j)) =

∏
j′ :(i′ ,j′ )∈p(i,j)sk
νj′ , if (i, j) ∈ psk
0 , otherwise
(3.10)
Average end-to-end delay constraint: By using the link margin variables
σi,j, we define as φ(σi,j) the delay of link (i, j) ∈ L. The function φ(·) is typically a
strictly convex, nonnegative valued, function of σ. The packet arrival process model
determines the way that φ(·) depends on σi,j. As described in [67] and [68], for
Poisson process arrival, we have




We define by φ(σ) the vector that has components the delay of all links of the
network.
Delay constraints indicate the QoS requirements imposed to a specific traffic
flow. Traffic flows that serve time-critical applications should have strict delay
constraints. The end-to-end delay is expressed by adding the link delays for each of
the links over path psk of source node s. We denote the upper bound average delay
constraint for each of the multiple paths of the source node s as Ds > 0. Hence, we
have that the average end-to-end delay constraint for every source node s is given
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by (using the routing matrix expressed in Eq. (3.3))
Rsφ(σ) ≤ 1Ds, ∀s ∈ S (3.12)
Scheduling constraint: The capacity ĉi,j allocated to the wireless link (i, j)
should lie on the capacity region specified by Λ, which we describe in Sec. 3.2.3.
Hence, our scheduling constraint is expressed as
ĉ ∈ Λ (3.13)
3.3.2 Utility Optimization
To determine the optimal traffic rate allocation to the different paths Ps, each
source s chooses a utility function Us(·) that evaluates the total data rate delivered
to the destination ds. Utility functions Us(·) are chosen to be strictly concave,
continuous, monotonically increasing and twice differentiable.
Trust estimates for the different paths psk of a source node (defined in Sec. 3.2.2)
should be incorporated to the selected utility function Us(·). Source nodes should
obtain greater utility when they decide to allocate higher traffic rate through rout-
ing paths with higher aggregate trust value tsk. Hence, the utility function for each








The primal utility optimization problem formulation, based on the capacity,
average end-to-end delay and scheduling constraints described in Eq. (3.9), (3.12)
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sk xsk ≤ ĉi,j − σi,j,∀(i, j) (3.15b)
Rsφ(σ) ≤ 1Ds, ∀s ∈ S (3.15c)
0 ≤ 1Txs ≤ Rs, ∀s ∈ S (3.15d)∑
psk∈Ps
tskxsk ≥ Rthress , ∀s ∈ S (3.15e)
ĉ ∈ Λ (3.15f)
The trust-aware utility optimization problem is a strongly convex optimization
problem, due to the strict concavity assumption of Us(·) and the convexity of the
capacity region. Therefore, there exists a unique optimal solution for the above
primal problem, which we refer to as (x∗, σ∗, ĉ∗).
3.4 Dual Decomposition Algorithm
In this section, we solve the utility optimization problem described in Eq. (3.15a)
by applying dual decomposition [65], [77]. The decomposition of the optimization
problem provides distributed algorithms, which solve the underlying optimization
problem. We note that strong duality holds for our optimization problem (duality
gap is zero) and thus we can solve it through its dual function.
We define the Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) associated with the ca-
pacity and average end-to-end delay constraints. Let λ denote the |L| × 1 vector
of link prices (dual variables) λi,j (otherwise denoted by λ`) associated with the
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capacity constraints for each wireless link. Also, let µs denote the Ps × 1 vector of
dual variables µsk associated with the average end-to-end delay constraints imposed
to every traffic flow s ∈ S.
In order to introduce the dual problem, we define the partial Lagrangian
L(x, σ, ĉ, λ, µ) of the optimization problem by using the inequality constraints given
from Eq. (3.15b) and (3.15c)











































































where λs is a sub-vector of the λ dual variable and is associated with the constraint
in Eq. (3.15b). It defines the |L| × 1 column link price vector related to the links













k:(i,j)∈psk µsk[(Rs)k(i,j)] denotes the combination of dual vari-
ables µ, which are related to a specific link (i, j) and is associated with the con-
straint (3.15c).
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The dual objective function h(·) is then expressed as





























The dual optimization problem is defined by minimizing the dual objective




For given dual variables λ and µ, we can identify in the above equation of
h(λ, µ) three decoupled maximization problems which we can solve separately. These
three problems correspond to source rate control in Eq. (3.18a), average end-to-end
delay control in Eq. (3.18b), and scheduling in Eq. (3.18c) respectively.
By solving these three independent optimization problems we can derive the
optimal values for the primal optimization problem x∗(λ, ν), σ∗(λ, µ) and ĉ∗(λ, µ)
(described in Eq. (3.15a)). Given these values, we can then solve the dual problem
by minimizing h(λ, µ) over λ, µ ≥ 0. There is no duality gap between the primal
and the dual, because the capacity region Λ [60], [76] is a convex set.
In the following subsections, we describe the decomposition of the dual objec-
tive function that leads to the cross-layer optimization problem and we specify the
optimal solutions by solving these independent subproblems.
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3.4.1 Source rate control
Based on the dual decomposition the traffic rate vector of source node s is
determined by the first maximization subproblem in Eq. (3.18a). Us(·) is a strictly
concave scalar function of the rate vector variable xs. The maximization prob-
lem in (3.18a) is maximization of a concave function subject to the convex con-
straints (3.15d) and (3.15e). Thus, it has a unique solution. Us(·) is continuously
differentiable. Hence, the maximum will be given by the numerical solution of the
equation
∇Us(x∗s) = Tsλs, ∀s ∈ S (3.20)
as long as the resulting solution for x∗s is in the interior of the constraint set de-
fined by (3.15d) and (3.15e). Otherwise the solution will lie at the corners of the
constrained set defined by (3.15d) and (3.15e).
It is important to note that each source node s is able to adjust its data
rate vector using its local observations on the link prices λi,j across the links of its
multiple routing paths and the aggregate trust values of the different paths and their
respective sub-paths.
3.4.2 Average End-to-End Delay Control
The second subproblem of the dual decomposition described in Eq. (3.18b) is
related to average end-to-end delay control based on the optimal values for the link
capacity margin σi,j. Eq. (3.18b) is a strictly convex, minimization problem, subject
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to the constraint that all sigma are nonnegative. Thus, it has a unique solution.
Function φ(·) is a continuously differentiable function. Hence, the optimal values of




(i,j) = −λi,j, ∀(i, j) ∈ L (3.21)
By Eq. (3.21), we observe that the updated dual variable related to the corre-
sponding wireless link is needed. Thus, explicit/implicit exchange of dual variables
between the different data sources is enabled.
3.4.3 Scheduling policy
The third problem of the dual decomposition determines the scheduling policy.






We need to find a scheduling policy so that the aggregate link weight
∑
(i,j)∈L λi,j ĉi,j
could be maximized. The solution to this scheduling subproblem is based on the
maximum weight scheduling policy introduced in [67]. This policy is described in
Alg. 1 presented below.
3.4.4 Distributed Algorithm
In this section, we describe the distributed algorithm that solves the network
utility optimization problem. Our solution is based on subgradient descent iterative
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Algorithm 1 Maximum-Weight Scheduling Policy [67]
1: Start scheduling timer
2: while Timer is ON do
3: if i has been scheduled by any of its neighboring nodes then
4: Send messages to notify all nodes in its interference set and stop the process.
5: else
6: Each incident link (i, j) is assigned a weight λi,j ĉi,j.
7: Find a link with the maximum weight among all incident links.
8: if link (i, j) is found then
9: Schedule the link with the effective allocated capacity ĉi,j.
10: Notify all neighbors in the interference set.
11: else





methods for the update of the dual variables. We first compute the subgradient of
the dual function with respect to each of the dual variables and then we propose
our distributed algorithm.













− σi,j,∀(i, j) (3.23)
The subgradient of h(λ, µ) with respect to dual variable µsk, which is related






φi,j(Rs)k(i,j),∀psk ∈ Ps,∀s (3.24)
In order to solve the dual problem of Eq. (3.19), we use a subgradient descent











































where γ is a positive step-size that ensures convergence of the iterative solution (e.g.
γ = 0.01) and (v)+ = max(0, v) is the projection to the non-negative value.
Based on the primal and dual variable updates of Eq. (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), (3.25)
and (3.26), we propose a distributed optimization algorithm, described in Alg. 2.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results for our trust-aware network utility
maximization problem. Fig. 3.2 represents the sample wireless network scenario.
69
Algorithm 2 Distributed Cross-Layer Optimization
1: INITIALIZE primal and dual variables
2: while 1T |x(n)s − x(n−1)s | ≤ ε do
3: Dual Variables Update
4: Each link (i, j) updates its dual variable λi,j (Eq. (3.25)).
5: Each source s updates the dual variables µsk (Eq. (3.26)).
6: Sources exchange dual variables
7: Each source s evaluates λs,(n).
8: Each source s computes its traffic rate vector x
(n)
s by solving Eq. (3.20).
9: Each link (i, j) evaluates µ(i,j),(n).
10: Each link (i, j) computes its σ
(n)
i,j by solving Eq. (3.21).
11: Each node performs scheduling via Eq. (3.22) as in [67].
12: end while
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The wireless network contains N = 8 nodes and L = 11 links, with maximum
allowable capacity ci,j chosen in [9, 11] Kbps. There is one traffic flow from s to ds,
which allocates traffic to different routing paths. Our simulation time is T = 160
time slots. The end-to-end delay constraint for the traffic flow is Ds = 2 msec.
Figure 3.2: Wireless Network Scenario
There are five different paths, where the source node s can allocate data traffic
to send to destination node ds. The paths psk are
ps1 = {(s, 1), (1, 2), (2, ds)}
ps2 = {(s, 1), (1, 4), (4, ds)}
ps3 = {(s, 3), (3, 2), (2, ds)}
ps4 = {(s, 3), (3, 4), (4, ds)}
ps5 = {(s, 5), (5, 6), (6, ds)}
We define four trust update periods (each period is defined every Tupdate time
slots), in order to show the behavior of our approach for different trust values. For
the simulations, we define Tupdate = T/4 = 40 time slots. Node trust estimates νi
change dynamically at every update period, based on the trust evaluation mech-
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anism. The different node trust values that we obtain from the trust evaluation
mechanism for each of the four update periods are shown at the matrix below
ν =

s 1 2 3 4 5 6 ds
1 1 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.5 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 1

(3.27)
Trust values are adjusted using the EWMA algorithm expressed in Eq. (3.4),
in order to prevent significant variations in the trust estimates over subsequent trust
update periods. For our simulation, the EWMA algorithm uses α = 0.8 to give more
significance to the latest update.
Given the trust values estimates in Matrix (3.27), we can notice that path
ps5 contains untrusted (malicious) nodes and should ideally be excluded from the
traffic rate assignment. In addition, node 3 is detected to be malicious and hence
our mechanism should ideally assign significantly less traffic to the paths ps3 and
ps4 that contain this node. Finally, node 4 obtains a low trust value estimate at the
last update period, which should lead to decrease in the traffic rate assignment even
for path ps2 that contains this node.
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b present the numerical results of the average traffic rate
allocation for two different cases of maximum allowable traffic rate Rs (with the
corresponding error bars). In the case of Rs = 10 Kbps, the maximum traffic rate
is close to the maximum allowable capacity of the wireless links, while in the case
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of Rs = 14 Kbps, the maximum traffic rate is greater than the maximum capacity
of the links. We observe that in both cases the traffic rate assigned to each routing
path changes at every update period based on the trust estimates. Our algorithm
assigns to the path ps1 the maximum traffic rate, since it contains trusted nodes and
to the path ps5 the lowest traffic rate, because it consists of untrusted nodes. For
the rest of the paths, the traffic rate is being adjusted according to trust estimates
of every update period. We also observe that in the case of Rs = 14 Kbps, more
traffic rate is allocated to untrusted paths to cover the demand.
Link capacity margins σi,j for some links of our wireless network, in the case
of Rs = 10 Kbps and Rs = 14 Kbps, are presented in Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b
respectively. Link capacity margin is related with the average delay, since higher
capacity margin indicates lower link delay and thus lower end-to-end delay. In
our scenario, link 1 has the lowest capacity margin, because our scheme allocates
significantly high traffic rate to this link. In addition, we notice that links belonging
to untrusted paths have high capacity link margin (e.g. link 7 and 11), since they do
not relay high data traffic. We also observe that in the case of higher maximum data
rate, the link margin takes lower values at the more congested links, because of the
higher traffic rate that should be allocated. Links that belong to untrusted paths,
such as link 5, are being allocated more traffic rate in the case of higher data rate, in
order to satisfy the underlying delay requirements. In general, the capacity margin
is being adjusted in order to attain the delay constraints of the traffic flow, which
in our scenario are being satisfied, even if our scheme has to reduce significantly the
capacity margin of some wireless links.
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(a) Average Traffic Rate with Rs = 10









































(b) Average Traffic Rate with Rs = 14
Figure 3.3: Average Traffic Rate over paths for different maximum rates Rs
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(a) Average Link Margin with Rs = 10



































(b) Average Link Margin with Rs = 14
Figure 3.4: Average Link Margin in wireless links over time
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we investigated an important application of performance and
security tradeoff by introducing security considerations in the cross layer design of
network protocols via network utility maximization (NUM). The specific concept of
security we used is trust. Users get higher utility by transmitting data through nodes
of higher trust values. Thus, trust values should be taken into account as parameters
in the optimization problem, so that the resulting trust-aware protocols are resilient
to network failures and to possible attacks. We also incorporated delay constraints in
the utility optimization problem to capture QoS requirements. Finally, we proposed
a distributed algorithm that achieves network utility maximization. As part of
future work, we plan to investigate how dynamic changes in trust values affect the
utility optimization problem, and to evaluate our approach in large scale scenarios.
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CHAPTER 4
Distributed Sleep Management for Heterogeneous Wireless
Machine-to-Machine Networks
In the previous two chapters, we investigated two security and resiliency prob-
lems in wireless multi-hop networks. Beginning from this chapter, we will provide
efficient solutions for energy preservation in wireless multi-hop networks. In this
chapter, we propose a distributed sleep management and some novel routing met-
rics that can be integrated to a standard routing protocol for machine-to-machine
(M2M) networks in order to reduce energy consumption.
4.1 Overview
Machine-to-machine (M2M) communications are part of the Internet of Things
(IoT) and connect resource-constrained smart objects (mainly sensor nodes) through
a lossy network. Smart objects are often heterogeneous in resources and capabilities
and have to operate with resource constraints, such as power and memory. Hence,
efficient resource management in M2M communications has attracted interest from
the research community.
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The challenges that we address in this work are:
• Save battery energy in an heterogeneous wireless multi-hop M2M network,
which consists of battery-powered nodes and mains-powered nodes.
• Manage efficiently battery node sleep schedules in a distributed manner.
• Route data packets when the majority of nodes is inactive and still satisfy
performance guarantees.
4.1.1 Related Work
In battery powered networks, efficient battery energy management is crucial for
network operation. Several schemes have been proposed to enable sleep management
and duty cycling for different type of networks. In [79], the authors propose the
Estimated Duty Cycle (EDC) metric, which takes into account duty cycling in
wireless sensor networks. They show that the EDC metric outperforms the standard
link metric Expected Transmission Count (ETX) [80] in terms of lifetime and end-to-
end delay. A distributed sleep control framework was also proposed in [81]. However,
we did not provide any method to realize distributed sleep control. In this work, we
introduce new efficient sleep management techniques.
Extending network lifetime and also maintaining acceptable packet delivery
rate is one of the major concerns in battery powered networks. The link metrics [82]
involve the measurement of a particular quantity for the link between a pair of nodes.
The link metrics aim to achieve high throughput but do not indicate energy level
of a node. Hence, energy-related routing metrics have been proposed. In [18], the
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authors use the residual energy (RE) as a routing metric and design a new objective
function for routing decision. They show that the RE metric outperforms the link
metric ETX in terms of network lifetime. To identify the energy-bottleneck nodes
and to prolong network lifetime, the expected lifetime (ELT) metric is introduced
in [19], which outperforms standard RE metric in terms of network stability. In [34],
the authors propose a routing metric that aims at maximizing lifetime and takes
into account network congestion, energy level and node degree. Simulation results
indicate that by using the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR), the
proposed metric outperforms standard metrics in different environmental conditions.
Finally, energy efficient routing algorithms have been recently proposed. In [83],
the authors introduce a central control algorithm that is based on cluster formation
to extend the network lifetime. An adaptive routing framework that satisfies certain
transmission cost requirements is proposed in [84].
4.1.2 Summary of Contributions
In this work, we propose new distributed sleep management techniques for
heterogeneous wireless M2M networks to efficiently manage battery lifetime. Our
network is heterogeneous in the sense that it consists of battery-powered nodes
(BPNs) and a low percent of mains-powered nodes (MPNs). BPNs schedule variable
length sleep intervals that start with an active period (AP), followed by a sleep
period (SP). BPNs decide the length of sleep intervals in a distributed manner based
on their local data traffic, which consists of buffered packets, self-generated packets,
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and prediction of incoming relay data traffic. For this purpose, we introduce a model
to estimate the number of incoming relay packets, in which we take into account
buffer overflow, channel uncertainty and probability of the BPN being active. In
this way, each BPN can predict the amount of incoming traffic and configure its
AP appropriately. In addition, we have proposed an AP extension scheme, which
gives BPNs flexibility to transmit or receive more data packets. The decision of
AP extension depends on the number of buffered packets and the amount of traffic
relayed in the last AP or AP extension. Hence, a BPN extends its AP in the case
it has plenty of packets to transmit or it is proved to be a reliable relay node.
We also introduce two novel battery energy aware metrics: Battery Node En-
ergy Waste (EW) and Battery Node Relay Cost (RC). These two metrics are node
related metrics and take into account sleep management and different causes of
energy depletion. They aim to discover the best route that satisfies some battery
related properties. The EW metric indicates the level of BPN’s energy consumption
due to idle listening and overhearing. Ideally, the routing protocol should reduce the
amount of energy waste in order to increase the network lifetime. Hence, selecting
a route with minimum energy waste is preferred for energy savings. The RC metric
exploits the energy consumption of the BPN due to receiving and transmitting relay
data packets. By using this routing metric, the routing protocol intends to balance
relay data traffic across the network in a way of prolonging network lifetime.
In addition, we propose some enhancements for the battery energy efficient
routing protocol B-RPL [81], which is an evolution of the standard routing protocol
RPL used in low-power and lossy networks, such as sensor networks. We introduce
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a routing metric advertisement technique and a routing objective function that aims
to find the routes to maximize network lifetime.
4.1.3 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the network model
that we consider in this chapter. Section 4.3 specifies the distributed sleep manage-
ment scheme. We describe our novel battery energy aware routing metrics in Sec-
tion 4.4. Enhancements of B-RPL are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides
extensive evaluation and analysis of the proposed distributed sleep management and
the newly introduced routing metrics based on simulations. We conclude our work
in Section 6.5.
4.2 Network Model and Assumptions
A multi-hop wireless machine-to-machine (M2M) network can be modeled as
a graph G(V,E). For example, in standard RPL [32], they model a network as the
Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). We consider a wireless
M2M network that consists of N heterogeneous nodes such that power source is
either power grid or battery. Nodes with power grid as power source are called
mains-powered nodes (MPNs) and nodes with battery as power source are called
battery-powered nodes (BPNs). MPNs have unlimited power supply and do not
suffer from energy depletion. Hence, MPNs do not sleep. However, BPNs face
significant energy depletion. There are several methodologies leading to energy
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saving from BPNs such as sleep control and energy aware routing metrics. Both of
them are being exploited in our work. Suppose we have M MPNs and B BPNs,
where N = B + M . Then, the percentage of MPNs in the network is defined as
pm = M/N .
We consider multi-point to point (MP2P) dominant traffic pattern with a sink
node. The parent of a node is defined as an immediate successor of the node on
a path towards the sink node. The child of a node is defined as an immediate
predecessor of the node on a path towards the sink node. Suppose we have a H-hop
network after topology formation and each layer may consist of router (relay) nodes
or leaf nodes or both. Leaf nodes do not have any child node in the topology and
only generate packets, but do not relay data packets. Router nodes generate packets
and at the same time they relay data packets generated or relayed by their children.
4.3 Distributed battery node sleep management
In this section, we introduce our distributed sleep management techniques
to prolong network lifetime. To define network lifetime, we adopt the most widely
used definition that is the time until the first BPN runs out of battery energy. Using
distributed sleep management, a BPN b sends a wakeup message upon waking up.
Once receiving such wakeup message, neighbors can send packets to node b. To
reduce the packet collision and save energy, AP is divided into a reception (RX)
period and a transmission (TX) period according to the traffic requirements and the
relative position of node b in the topology graph. Node b dynamically determines
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its RX period length and TX period length based on the number of buffered packets
NBPb , the number of self-generated packets N
SP
b and the number of incoming (relay)
packets NRPb . Node b includes its RX period length and TX period length in wakeup
message.
4.3.1 Model for incoming data packet arrival rate estimation
A BPN b knows its NBPb and can compute N
SP
b based on its packet generation
rate RSb . To compute N
RP
b , the incoming data packet arrival rate, denoted by R
I
b ,
needs to be calculated. We therefore propose a model to calculate RIb .
To estimate RIb , we assume a h-hop node selects (h-1)-hop nodes for its parent
set (hierarchical structure). Chj , BRChj andMRChj denote a h-hop node j’s child set,
battery-powered router child set and mains-powered router child set, respectively,
where BRChj ⊂ Chj and MRChj ⊂ Chj . Moreover, BPhi and MPhi denote a h-hop
node i’s battery powered parent set and a mains powered parent set, respectively.
We first model the successful packet delivery probability psij from node i to
node j. This probability takes into account possible packet drops due to queue
overflow and wireless channel conditions. We denote packet drop probability due to
queue overflow for node i as pqi . This probability is estimated by using the number
of packets deleted due to full queue, and the number of packets being pushed into
queue measured in previous sleep interval. Queue overflow can lead to significant
performance decrease. Let pcij be the packet drop rate due to link condition from i
to j, which can be approximated using ETX as pcij = 1− 1ETX .
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Combining the two probabilities, we can estimate the probability for a packet





The probability of a MPN m being active is equal to 1 since MPNs do not
sleep. For a BPN b, we denote its AP length as T ab and SP length T
s
b in a sleep
interval. Therefore, the probability of node b being active can be estimated by
pab =
T ab




Combing equations (4.1) and (4.2), the probability for a h-hop node i to suc-









and the probability for a h-hop node i to successfully send a packet to a mains









The estimation of incoming data packet arrival rate is conducted using the
recursion approach. Let RSi be the data packet generation rate of node i. In a
H-hop network, H-hop nodes are leaf nodes and therefore, do not relay packets. For




RSi ∗ P2BHib (4.5)




RSi ∗ P2MHim (4.6)
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RSi ∗ P2Bh+1ib +
∑
i∈BRChb
RIi ∗ RSi ∗ P2Bh+1ib +
∑
i∈MRChb













4.3.2 Active Period Length Estimation
For a BPN b, AP length T ab equals the sum of the RX period length T
RX
b
and the TX period length T TXb . To efficiently estimate node b’s T
a
b , our distributed
algorithms consider the sleep state of the parent nodes as well as the current and





indicate the future traffic amount. Node b has a large TX period if it has more
packets to transmit and a large RX period if it needs to relay more packets.
Let QCb be the queue capacity of node b. Estimation of RX period length
TRXb,e is given in Alg. 3, which considers buffered packets, self-generated packets and
incoming relay packets. Ideally, node b receives until its queue is full and then starts
transmitting. However, it may take a long time to fill up the queue if both RSb and
RIb are small. Therefore, a threshold T
RX
TH is defined.
Estimation of the TX period length T TXb,e is given in Alg. 4. In TX period,
node b does not expect incoming relay packets and only considers buffered packets
85
Algorithm 3 RX Period Length Estimation
1: if NBPb = Q
C
b , i.e., queue is full then









, i.e., time to fill up queue
5: if TRXb,e > T
RX
TH then





and self-generated packets. We assume RSb is less than the packet transmission rate
RTb . Otherwise, node b cannot sleep. Ideally, node b transmits until its queue is
empty. However, it may take a long time to empty queue if no parent is active.
Hence, a threshold T TXTH is defined.
Algorithm 4 TX Period Length Estimation





, i.e., time to empty queue
2: if T TXb,e > T
TX
TH then




We use both estimated lengths (TRXb,e , T
TX





in the previous sleep interval to configure the AP length using the exponential
weighted moving average (EWMA) [55] with a weight parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as
T ab = α ∗ TRXb,p + (1− α) ∗ TRXb,e + α ∗ T TXb,p + (1− α) ∗ T TXb,e (4.9)
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4.3.3 Sleep Period Length Estimation
In sleep mode, a BPN b does not receive any packets and does not transmit any
packets. Only the self-generated data packets are pushed into the queue. Ideally,
node b can sleep until its queue is full. However, it may take a long time to fill up
the queue if RSb is small. Therefore, a threshold T
S
TH is defined. The SP length T
S
b
computation is provided in Alg. 5.
Algorithm 5 Sleep Period Length Estimation





, i.e., time to fill up queue
2: if T Sb > T
S
TH then




4.3.4 Active Period Extension
AP extension is a crucial part of the distributed sleep management. It is
necessary in cases BPNs need to transmit or receive more packets. At the end of
the AP or AP extension, a BPN b determines whether to extend its AP. We define
two modes in which the AP is extended. The first mode is the transmission mode
described in Alg. 6, which represents the case node b has plenty of buffered packets,
i.e., NBPb is greater than a queue threshold QTH . The second mode is the reception
mode described in the Alg. 7, which indicates that node b is either a reliable relay,
i.e., it has received packets and has forwarded all of them, or has not received
packets for a long period of time and therefore has more battery energy. In Alg. 6
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and 7, TREb is the latest RX period ending time among all active parents, T
EQ
b is
the time needed for node b to transmit all buffered packets, T TEb is the latest TX
period ending time among all active parents, TMTb is the time needed for node b to
transmit the maximum number of allowed packets in parent’s TX period (NMAPT ),
NRb is the number of packets received, and ETH is the energy threshold.
Algorithm 6 Active Period (AP) Extension (Transmission Mode)
1: // Transmission Mode (NBPb > QTH)
2: if ∃Parent in RX period then
3: Extend AP by min{TREb , T
EQ
b }
4: else if ∃Parent in TX period then
5: Extend AP by min{T TEb , TMTb }
6: else if @Parent active then
7: Pick probability p1 = C1 ∗NBPb /QCb
8: Extend AP by NBPb /Q
C
b second with probability p1
9: if Energy of node b is greater than ETH then
10: Send AP extension notification message
11: end if
12: end if
Our AP extension is a combination of deterministic and probabilistic ap-
proaches. In transmission mode, if node b has any parent in RX period it attempts
to transmit all buffered packets, and if node b has any parent in TX period it at-
tempts to transmit NMAPT packets. Probabilistic extension depends on probabilities
p1, p2 and p3. The p1 is related to queue utilization and it needs to be greater for
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bigger queue utilization. The p2 and p3 are related to hop count of node b and are
greater as node b approaches the sink node. Nodes having large hop count should
not extend their AP with high probability if they are in reception mode. We choose
appropriately the constants C1, C2 and C3 based on our objective. We want to
extend AP with relatively high probability if node b is in transmission mode and
therefore C1 has a large value. On the other hand, a node should extend its AP in
reception mode only if it is proved to be a reliable relay, or if it has not received
packets for several consecutive active periods or AP extensions. Hence, C2 and C3
are chosen to have smaller values than C1. In simulation, we set C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.2,
C3 = 0.1, n1 = 5, n2 = 20 and T
a
min = 0.1 sec (chosen parameters in our AP
extension algorithm).
Alg. 6 and 7 show that node b only announces AP extension in the reception
mode but not in the transmission mode. The number of times a BPN can extend
its AP varies among different objectives. For higher packet delivery rate, a BPN
can extend its AP as many times as needed. This process is called PDR-oriented
extension. To achieve longer network lifetime, a BPN can extend its AP up to a
threshold of consecutive times (5 in simulation). This process is called Lifetime-
oriented extension.
4.3.5 Transmission (TX) Control in Active Period
Using distributed sleep management, all nodes must monitor and maintain
parents’ RX and TX schedules. MPNs are considered to be in RX period all the
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time. BPNs announce their RX and TX schedules in the wakeup and AP extension
messages. A node (BPN or MPN) should send packets to parents, which are in RX
periods and it should select the best parent to send packets. A node sends packets to
a parent during that parent’s TX period only if its queue overflows and no parent is
in RX period. Due to distributed sleep schedules, a node may miss parent’s wakeup
message or AP extension message. In the case of queue overflow, even if a node
does not receive RX and TX schedules from a parent, it can still send a packet to
that parent if (i) the node overhears transmission from that parent or (ii) the node
overhears a neighbor’s transmission to that parent.
4.4 Battery energy aware routing metrics for heterogeneous networks
Different metrics are being used to exploit diverse characteristics of the network
and to provide QoS guarantees. Routing metrics can be characterized as node and
link related metrics. Link metrics [82] involve the measurement of a particular
quantity for the link between a pair of nodes. Typical link metrics are Expected
Transmission Count (ETX) introduced in [80] that estimates the expected number
of transmissions (including retransmissions) required to send a unicast packet over
a link, Link Bandwidth (BW) introduced in [85] that measures link bandwidth
using the Packet Pair method and Expected Transmission Time (ETT) metric that
combines both ETX and BW metrics. On the other hand, node metrics indicate
current node status based on the different routing objectives. Node status includes
typical resources, such as CPU usage, available energy, remaining residual energy
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or some variation of the above. Our objective is to propose metrics which take into
account energy waste and distributed sleep management model. Hence, in our work
we focus on node related routing metrics that provide some information related to
sleep or energy consumption. We propose two novel routing metrics Battery Node
Energy Waste (EW) and Battery Node Relay Cost (RC), which can be used under
various objective functions, and in the performance evaluation section we compare
them with standard RE metric. In addition, we introduce a distributed measurement
method for ETX metric related to the upward traffic, which is dominant for machine-
to-machine communications that use RPL protocol. Both battery-aware routing
metrics require an estimation of ETX metric to compute some underlying related
quantities.
4.4.1 Battery Node Energy Waste (EW)
Battery node energy waste (EW) measures energy consumption from opera-
tions not related with transmission and reception of control and data packets. The
mains causes of energy waste for battery powered nodes in heterogeneous machine-
to-machine networks are idle listening and overhearing. Idle listening indicates how
efficient is our proposed distributed sleep management model, because ideally bat-
tery powered nodes should consume as little energy from idle listening as possible
and be active only during time periods that have to transmit or receive control or
data packets. EW is sleep-aware metric and is used to forward traffic through more
sleep effective intermediate nodes, which have consumed less energy to idle listening
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and overhearing.
EW is an additive metric and can be used to define a path cost by exploiting
different objective functions (OF). For MPNs, we define EW = 0. For a BPN
b, computation of EW metric involves energy consumption on packet transmission
(ETX) and energy consumption on packet reception (ERX), which are given by








where NT is the number of packets transmitted by b, NR is the number of packets
received by b, PT is the transmission power, PR is the reception power, LP is the
average packet length and DR is the PHY data rate. Let E0 be the initial energy
and REt be the residual energy at time t. The total energy consumption is given
by Ec = E0 −REt. Hence, EW at time t is computed as
EW = Ec − (ETX + ERX) (4.12)
4.4.2 Battery Node Relay Cost (RC)
Battery node relay cost (RC) measures energy consumption related to trans-
mission and reception of relayed traffic. By relayed data traffic, we define data
packets that are not originated by this node, but are forwarded to the next hop
towards the destination node. RC metric distributes relayed data traffic across
intermediate nodes, because our objective function selects paths with small RC.
RC is also an additive metric. RC metric balances relay packets across interme-
diate nodes with an objective function of selecting paths with small RC. For MPNs,
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we define RC = 0. For a BPN b, computation of the RC metric involves the energy
consumption on relay packet transmission (ERTX) and the energy consumption on
relay packet reception (ERRX), which are given by








where NRT is the number of relay packets transmitted by b and NRR is the number
of relay packets received by b. At time t, RC metric is computed as
RC = ERTX + ERRX (4.15)
4.4.3 Distributed ETX Measurement
In this section, we briefly describe the distributed ETX measurement process.
We take into account only the upward traffic for the MP2P traffic pattern. A child
node maintains a sequence number for each parent. A parent node uses the sequence
number to determine the upward ETX for each child. In order to send updated ETX
to children, parents use different approaches depending on whether they are battery-
powered or mains-powered. Battery-powered parents include a (Child, ETX) list in
wakeup messages so that once a child receives the wakeup message, it also obtains
updated ETX metric. On the other hand, the mains-powered nodes broadcast
(Child, ETX) lists periodically so that the mains-powered children can receive the
ETX update and unicast the ETX update to a battery-powered child once they
receive a wakeup message from the child. By using this approach, every child obtains
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updated ETX for each parent and can use it to compute routing metrics, such as
EW and RC, or select routes based on ETX.
4.5 Battery metric aware B-RPL routing protocol
Distributed sleep management and battery energy aware metrics are used to
enhance the B-RPL protocol [81]. The B-RPL protocol is an enhanced version
of standard RPL [32] (used widely for routing in sensor networks) to support dis-
tributed sleep control in networks consisting of heterogeneous nodes. In this section,
we present enhancements that we have proposed for B-RPL.
4.5.1 Metric Advertisement
Metric advertisement and updates are crucial in order to select the best route
among all the candidate routes. In our protocol, routing metrics, e.g., EW, RC, RE
and ETX, are not only included in the DODAG Information Object (DIO) messages
but also in the wakeup messages. In this way, all the children have updated metrics
regarding the candidate routes every time that they receive a wakeup message from a
parent. This approach is lightweight and does not significantly increase the overhead
since BPNs have to transmit wakeup messages.
4.5.2 Objective Function (OF) for Route Selection
Objective Function (OF) specifies how routing protocols select routes based
on specific metrics. For example, for hop count metric and the shortest path OF,
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a node will select the routes with minimum hop count to the sink node. For each
metric, different objective functions can be defined.
Our objective is to maximize the network lifetime and maintain an acceptable
packet delivery rate. Hence, we identify some OF candidates that satisfy our goal.
To maximize the network lifetime, we focus on reducing the maximum energy con-
sumption among BPNs and not the total energy consumption. Therefore, we choose
an OF that selects path p from a set of candidate paths P as
p ∈ argminp∈P [maxi∈p(RoutingMetric(i))] (4.16)
where i is a node on path p and RoutingMetric(i) is the value of routing metric at
node i. In case of EW, this OF tries to find a path that wastes the least battery
energy and in case of RC, this OF tries to find a path that relays the least packets.
Thus, in both cases, this OF tries to minimize the maximum energy consumption
of a node in the network and maximize the lifetime.
In the case of the standard RE metric, we are trying to find the path that has
the maximum residual energy. Therefore, we use the OF described as
p ∈ argmaxp∈P [mini∈p(RE(i))] (4.17)
4.6 Performance Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we present an extensive performance evaluation of our dis-
tributed sleep management scheme and battery energy aware routing metrics using
the NS2 simulator [86]. The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC and PHY are modified to support
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the sleep operation. We simulated a heterogeneous wireless M2M network contain-
ing 500 nodes deployed in a 23× 23 grid. Each unit in the grid represents a 10× 10
square meter real-world field and contains a single node. Each node is randomly
placed in its corresponding square field. A data sink is placed at the center of the
grid. Our M2M network consists of BPNs and MPNs. All BPNs have 100% of bat-
tery level at the beginning of the simulation. We examine low percentage of MPNs
that varies from 1% to 20%, but in this dissertation we present results only for the
scenario that we have 5% MPNs in the network.
In the periodic sleep (PS) scenario, each BPN has a fixed sleep interval with
fixed AP length and SP length and wakes up in a periodic pattern. In this case, there
is no AP and SP configurations and no AP extension as described in Section 4.3.
In simulation, the sleep interval for all BPNs is 60 seconds with 0.05 seconds of
AP and 59.95 seconds of SP. We use PS scheme as the benchmark for comparing
performance of our distributed sleep (DS) scheme.
In our simulation, we have also introduced the structured mains-powered node
placement (SMNP) and we compare its performance with random mains-powered
node placement (RMNP). In SMNP case, we place selected MPNs in specific grid
units. For example, the selected MPNs are placed in horizontal, vertical or diagonal
lines from the center of the grid that the sink node is placed.
The enhanced B-RPL is used as routing protocol. EW, RC and RE metrics
are used in simulation. We simulated the data collection scenario in which each
node (BPN or MPN) generates 1 packet per minute. The queue capacity of each
node is 15 and our simulation runs for 15000 seconds. We use several performance
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metrics for our evaluation but the main ones are packet delivery rate (PDR), network
lifetime and idle time percentage of BPNs.
4.6.1 Distributed Sleep Management and Structured Mains-powered
Node Placement Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the DS scheme and
the SMNP using newly introduced routing metrics. We compare the performance
of the DS scheme with the performance of the PS scheme under different scenarios.
Following figures show simulation results for 5% of MPNs.
Fig. 4.1 compares the PDR for different scenarios with EW metric. The PS
with RMNP has only 10% of PDR. However, the DS with RMNP obtains 33% of
PDR. Therefore, the DS improves PDR by 23%. The PS with SMNP obtains 46%
of PDR. On the other hand, the DS with SMNP achieves 78% of PDR. In this case,
the DS improves PDR by 32%. With the PS, SMNP improves PDR by 36% and
with the DS, SMNP improves PDR by 45%. These results indicate the importance
of the MPN placement and they also show that the DS utilizes MPNs better than
the PS does. Fig. 4.2 shows the minimum battery node energy level, which indicates
the network lifetime. The PS provides longer network lifetime in expense of PDR,
but the DS still maintains comparable network lifetime.
Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 show results using the RC metric. It can be seen that
the DS and SMNP achieve similar results as those using the EW metric. The DS
achieves much higher PDR and comparable network lifetime compared with the PS.
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Figure 4.1: PDR Per Sleep Scheme



































Figure 4.2: Lifetime Per Sleep Scheme
4.6.2 Routing Metrics Performance Comparison
In this section, we present the performance comparison for our newly intro-
duced battery energy aware routing metrics EW and RC described in Section 4.4.
We use the standard RE metric for benchmark comparison. The combined DS
and SMNP scenario is used since it is the optimized case. Following figures show
simulation results for 5% of MPNs.
Fig. 4.5 compares the PDR across all the routing metrics in the optimized
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Figure 4.3: PDR Per Sleep Scheme



































Figure 4.4: Lifetime Per Sleep Scheme
scenario. The EW and RC metrics have improved PDR by almost 10% compared
with the standard RE metric. The EW achieves the highest PDR. Fig. 4.6 shows
that the EW and RC metrics also perform better in terms of network lifetime than
RE metric does. However, the RC metric achieves the best performance in terms of
network lifetime. Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 indicate the efficiency of the proposed battery
energy aware routing metrics.
Fig. 4.7 shows the idle time percentage of the BPNs. Across all routing metrics
the idle time percentage is low for all BPNs, which indicates that the proposed
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Figure 4.5: PDR Per Routing Metric


































Figure 4.6: Lifetime Per Routing Metric
distributed sleep management scheme is very efficient so that BPNs are active only
if they need to ensure reliability.
Finally, we also have results showing that the total energy consumption for all
BPNs is lower using the EW and RC metrics in comparison with the standard RE
metric.
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Figure 4.7: Battery Node Idle Time Percentage Per Routing Metric
4.7 Concluding Remarks
We propose new distributed sleep management techniques for battery powered
nodes in heterogeneous wireless machine-to-machine networks. The distributed sleep
management techniques enable each battery-powered node to self-determine the op-
timal times to sleep or wake up and process data based on traffic measurements
and predictions. We also propose two novel battery energy aware routing metrics,
battery node energy waste (EW) and battery node relay cost (RC), that take into
account the main causes of energy depletion. Our distributed sleep management can
improve packet delivery rate (PDR) by 32% compared with periodic sleep scenario
while maintaining comparable network lifetime. Our EW and RC metrics outper-
form the standard residual energy (RE) metric in terms of PDR, network lifetime
and idle time percentage. As part of future work, we plan to investigate the combi-
nation of energy aware routing metrics based on the routing objective and a formal
optimization approach for defining the placement of mains powered nodes.
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Algorithm 7 Active Period (AP) Extension (Reception Mode)
1: // Reception Mode (NBPb ≤ QTH)
2: if Node b has received and forwarded data packets during last AP or AP exten-
sion then
3: Pick probability p2 = C2/hop count with C1 > C2
4: if Node b is in this mode for n1 consecutive times then
5: if Energy of node b is greater than ETH then
6: Extend AP by NRb /Q
C
b second with probability p2
7: Send AP extension notification message
8: end if
9: end if
10: else if Node b has not received data packets during last AP or AP extension
then
11: Pick probability p3 = C3/hop count with C2 > C3
12: if Node b is in this mode for n2 consecutive times then
13: if Energy of node b is greater than ETH then
14: Extend AP by T amin with probability p3






Multi-Metric Energy Efficient Routing Scheme for Mobile
Ad-hoc Networks
In the previous chapter, we introduced a new distributed sleep management
scheme and novel routing metrics for heterogeneous machine-to-machine networks
and we integrated and examined their performance in a standard routing protocol
for this type of networks. In this chapter, we propose a novel unified routing metric
for energy-aware routing in dynamic networks, such as mobile ad-hoc networks,
which is also integrated to a standard routing protocol.
5.1 Overview
Mobile communication systems without central management have been gain-
ing popularity in the form of multi-hop ad-hoc networks. Multi-hop ad-hoc networks
have widespread applications ranging from military scenarios, handling emergencies
and natural disasters to distributed processing of data. This type of mobile net-
works do not rely on any pre-established infrastructure and all nodes should be
able to communicate with other nodes directly or indirectly through intermediate
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nodes. Hence, routing is a key operation in this type of networks and the appro-
priate selection of routing scheme affects its performance. For this reason designing
efficient routing schemes has been an extensive research area in the last decade. Mo-
bile ad-hoc networks (MANET) is one form of wireless multi-hop ad-hoc networks,
where network topology changes dynamically. Many proactive (e.g. OLSR [33]) and
reactive routing protocols (e.g. AODV [38]) for MANET have been developed.
Limited battery life of mobile nodes impose an important limitation in the
performance of this type of networks. Power depletion of a mobile node affects its
ability to forward packets on behalf of other nodes and may lead to partitioning of
the network. Therefore, efficient battery utilization and increase of network lifetime
should be important design criteria for developing routing schemes in MANET.
While many energy efficient routing protocols have been presented [87], [88],
[89] to optimize energy consumption across the network, these protocols are mostly
based on a single routing metric, which is derived from energy measurements. For
example, some of the current techniques use the reciprocal value of the residual
energy to do minimum energy consumption routing [20], [21] or they use Minimum
Drain Rate (MDR) mechanism [20], [22]. These approaches, based on a single metric,
are myopic and do not consider all the possible causes of energy depletion in the
network. Thus, the investigation of a combination of network parameters (multiple
metrics), which are not strictly derived by residual energy but still indicate energy
depletion levels in parts of the network, will contribute to designing more efficient
routing schemes.
Our insight for this work is to determine a wider set of cross-layer parameters,
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not solely based on energy measurements, that enable effective prediction of low
energy paths, while encouraging uniform utilization of network resources. First, we
identify the reasons that cause energy depletion in different parts of the network
and then choose our metrics to mitigate their effect. We take into consideration
three metrics in our routing scheme: MAC queue utilization, residual energy and
node degree. MAC queue utilization is introduced to help our routing scheme to
predict and avoid congested parts of the network, which are subject to high energy
consumption due to the number of packet transmissions. Residual energy is crucial,
because we want to choose paths, which include less depleted nodes. Finally, node
degree contributes to reducing the energy consumption due to overhearing in the
neighbor nodes of a possible intermediate node of the selected path.
5.1.1 Related Work
The problem of designing energy efficient routing protocols has received signif-
icant attention by the research community for over a decade. Many energy efficient
routing schemes have been developed [87], [88], [89], which are typically based on
residual energy derived metrics. In particular, a lot of research has been conducted
on modifying standard routing protocols in MANET, such as AODV [89], [90],
DSR [22] and OLSR [20], [21], [91], [92] and [93].
Many energy efficient variations of OLSR modify both the MPR selection
and the route computation algorithm. For the MPR selection, some protocols [21]
choose the 1-hop neighbors with the maximum residual energy, while some others
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modify the willingness metric of the 1-hop neighbors [20], [91] based on the energy
level. In addition, an algorithm that takes into account the residual energy of the
1-hop and 2-hop neighbors of the MPR candidate is presented in [92]. To make the
routing decision, most of the techniques proposed above modify the routing metrics
to take into account energy consumption. Commonly used metrics for computing
path costs, such as reciprocal value of residual energy [20]. [21] and drain rate in
intermediate nodes [20], [22], are only based on energy measurements.
Multiple metrics routing schemes, which are more related to our work, have
also been proposed. An adaptive multiple metrics routing scheme for AODV is
introduced in [90]. The authors take into account three routing metrics, which are
hop count, traffic load and energy cost, and combine them to evaluate the cost of
the paths. In addition, a predictive multiple metrics routing scheme for proactive
protocols, like OLSR, is presented in [93]. The chosen routing metrics are mean
queueing delay, energy cost and residual link lifetime. The authors designed a
multi-objective routing schemes that evaluates the multiple metrics in a composite
way and achieves better performance in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and
network lifetime.
5.1.2 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter of the dissertation, we focus on designing a novel multiple
metric routing scheme to be applied in dynamic wireless multi-hop networks, such
as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), based on the described metrics, and integrate
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it to standard OLSR to examine its effectiveness. We combine the multiple metrics
to compute a weight for each node. These weights are efficiently propagated to the
rest of the network. Then, we propose a weight-based routing scheme, which will
use a greedy approach to choose the path with the lower cost, computed from the
weights the nodes received. In this way, the routing scheme takes into account the
multiple metrics introduced and switches paths in order to avoid energy-depleted,
highly congested and dense areas of the network. The contributions of this chapter
are:
• Introduction of a combination of routing metrics from multiple layers, which
has not been examined in any previous work related to energy efficient routing
• Proposal of a novel multi-metric routing scheme, which takes into account the
above metrics, and integrate it to standard OLSR
• Experimentation with the modified OLSR using NS3 [94] and examination of
its energy behavior and its performance (in terms of Network Lifetime and
PDR) compared to the standard OLSR
5.1.3 Chapter Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We describe our multi-metric
routing scheme in Section 5.2. We verify our claims by extensive simulations in
Section 5.3.
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5.2 Multi-Metric Energy Efficient Routing Scheme
The main goal of our routing scheme is to increase the network lifetime, with-
out loss of performance, and we use OLSR as a case study. For the purpose of this
work, lifetime is defined as the time until the battery of any mobile node of our
ad-hoc network depletes. We adopt this definition because, in the worst case, the
depletion of a node may possibly cause network partition. To prevent the energy
depletion and increase the network lifetime, we need to take into account cross layer
parameters. These parameters include network congestion, residual energy of mo-
bile nodes, as well as, network topology parameters. We aim to modify OLSR to
make routing decisions according to these parameters and measure the performance
improvement of our approach compared with the standard OLSR, using various
performance metrics.
In this section, we introduce the routing metrics for our scheme and describe
the modifications that need to be done in the OLSR protocol. We present the
metrics propagation mechanism in detail and a greedy approach to make routing
decisions based on the current values of the metrics.
5.2.1 Routing Metrics
We are mainly interested in defining the network parameters that affect the
network lifetime, which will be our main performance metric. An intuitive way to
select an appropriate set of metrics for energy efficient routing is to first investigate
the causes of energy depletion. The residual energy in mobile nodes is being depleted
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in two ways [20]:
1. Packet Transmission: each transmission causes energy consumption at the
mobile node
2. Overhearing from the neighbor nodes: Due to the broadcast nature of
the wireless channel, all the nodes in the neighborhood of a sender node may
overhear its packets transmission, even if they are not the receivers. Reception
of these packets results to unnecessary expenditure of battery energy of the
recipients.
The proposed routing scheme takes into account three routing metrics to es-
timate the path cost and make the routing decision:
1. MAC queue utilization: This parameter indicates network congestion.
When a mobile node has to transmit a lot of packets then this will lead to
a significant energy consumption. Thus, larger weight should be assigned to
nodes with high MAC queue utilization.
2. Residual energy: This parameter is crucial in order to determine the next-
hop node. The traffic should be directed to nodes that have enough residual
energy to transmit. Hence, we should assign a large weight to nodes that have
small residual energy to do forwarding.
3. Node Degree: The degree of a node is the number of nodes that belong
to its one-hop neighborhood. As we mentioned before, one reason for energy
depletion is overhearing. We will try to avoid forwarding packets through
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nodes with high degree, because this will cause greater overall energy depletion.
In addition, lower degree nodes also reduce the size of the interference graph,
so fewer collisions will happen during our packet transmissions.
We use a weight-based routing scheme, where a weight is assigned dynamically
at each node. Mobile nodes update their routing tables according to the path costs
computed using the nodes’ weights received at each time period. The metrics are
normalized by their maximum values and they contribute additively to the node’s














αi = 1, Li is the number of packets in the MAC queue, Ei is the residual
energy at each time and Di is the node degree. Lmax is the maximum considered
MAC queue size, Emax is the initial energy of a node and Dmax is the number of
nodes in the network minus one. By varying the weighting factors, we can change the
importance of the three routing metrics during route discovery. For our experiments,
we gave equal value to all αi.
5.2.2 Modifications in the standard OLSR
5.2.2.1 TC packet format
The proactive nature of OLSR indicates that nodes need to periodically receive
other nodes weights, in order to compute the path costs and update their routing
tables. Thus, it is crucial to find a way to propagate nodes weights to the network
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Figure 5.1: TC packet format
without increasing network overhead. An effective way is to embed this informa-
tion to the TC packets that are periodically generated by each node. This does
not introduce significant overhead, in contrast to new packets being generated to
advertise the weights, and is easily implementable in routing protocols. Therefore,
we extend the TC packet to include a field for the updated weight (computed locally
using equation (1)) of the originator node, as shown in Figure 5.1. Nodes receive
and process the new TC packets and create topology tuples in their topology table.
Topology tuples include the originator node of TC, the destination node, which is
one of the nodes advertised in the TC packet, and also the weight of the originator
node.
5.2.2.2 MPR selection
We have not modified the way that OLSR selects MPRs in our scheme. It is
based on the heuristic that the MPR set should cover all the nodes that are two
hops away (two-hop neighborhood).
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5.2.2.3 Routing Table Computation
OLSR is based on minimum hop routing to proactively determine the next-hop
for a specific destination node. Thus, we need to change the way the routing table
is computed using OLSR. The update of routing tables should be based on the path
costs computed from the nodes weights and not on the number of hops. In addition,
routing tables should include path costs to the destination address instead of the
number of hops, as in standard OLSR. We define path cost as the sum of weights
of the intermediate nodes along the path plus a constant weight, equal to 1, that
corresponds to the source node. We do not consider the receiver’s weight, because
the energy consumption during transmission of a packet from an intermediate node
is much greater than the power consumption of the receiver. To periodically update
the routing table based on the computed path costs, we use the greedy heuristic
scheme outlined in Algorithm 8.
The algorithm assigns cost equal to 1 to paths towards the 1-hop neighbors.
Then, it examines the topology tuples stored in the topology table and three cases
are considered in order to update the routing table. The first one occurs when there
is an entry in the routing table for the originator node (last addr) of the topology
tuple. In this case, we add a new entry to the routing table for the destination node
of TC (dest addr) with cost equal to the sum of the cost corresponding to route to
the originator node (last addr.cost) and the originator node’s weight. The second
case, where the greedy nature of our algorithm applies, occurs when there are entries
for both the originator and the destination node of the topology tuple. Then, we
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Algorithm 8 Greedy Heuristic Algorithm
1: Clear Routing Table ()
2: for i← 1, NumberofNeighbors do
3: Add New Entry in the Routing Table
4: cost← 1
5: end for
6: for i← 1, NumberofTopologyTuples do
7: have last← Lookup(RouteTable, last addr)
8: have dest← Lookup(RouteTable, dest addr)
9: if have last← true ∧ have dest← false then
10: Add New Entry in the Routing Table:
11: dest← dest addr
12: next addr ← last addr.next address
13: interface← last addr.interface
14: cost← last addr.cost+ tc weight
15: else if have last← true ∧ have dest← true then
16: UPDATE ROUTING ENTRY(last addr, dest addr, tc cost) {If Needed}
17: else




choose greedily the new path detected through the originator node or we maintain
the old path, by comparing their costs. Finally, in the case we do not have entries
neither for the originator node nor the destination node, we do not create any new
entry.
An interesting result observed using the proposed modified routing scheme
is that the nodes tend to choose longer paths, when the intermediate nodes of the
currently selected paths have consumed a lot of energy. The observed path switching
indicates that our routing scheme disperses the traffic across the network and utilizes
the network resources in a more uniform way to increase network lifetime.
5.3 Performance evaluation
In this section, we will describe the different performance metrics used to
evaluate our scheme, the simulation setup and the simulation results. For our sim-
ulations, we used the NS3 network simulator [94] and we created a modified version
of OLSR to execute our experiments.
5.3.1 Performance Metrics
The performance metrics should be selected appropriately, such that we are
able to show the efficiency of our scheme in comparison with the standard routing
protocol. The metrics that we consider for the evaluation of our modified scheme
are:
1. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) (in %): The ratio of the number of packets
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delivered to the destination nodes over the number of packets sent by the
source nodes. We use the normalized PDR, which is defined as the number of
packets delivered divided by the number of packets that should ideally been
transmitted in this data rate. This gives more representative results.
2. Network Lifetime (in sec): The time until the battery of a mobile node of
our mobile ad-hoc network depletes. There are several different definitions for
network lifetime introduced in the literature, but we assume that the deple-
tion of a mobile node may lead to network partition, due to the dynamically
changing network topology in this type of networks.
3. Average Node Residual Energy vs Time: This metric was first pro-
posed in [91]. It shows how the average energy consumption (total residual
energy[J]/number of nodes) changes over time.
4. Distribution of node residual energy: This metric [92] indicates how the
energy is consumed across the network. It shows how many nodes have the
same percentage of residual energy at the end of the simulation. Ideally we
should have a big number of nodes that will have 30-70 % of their residual
energy at the end of the simulation. This would illustrate that our modified
scheme disperses the traffic across different paths in the mobile network and
utilizes more uniformly the network resources.
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Table 5.1: Simulation parameters




Packet Size 512 bytes
Start of Traffic 30 sec
Initial Node Energy 7 Joules
Transmission Power 5 dbm
Simulations/Scenario 3
Link bandwidth 1 Mbps
5.3.2 Simulation Setup
We simulated a MANET with 30 nodes in a dense 2000 x 2000 meter square
area, which has 4 hop network diameter. There are 3 CBR/UDP sources generating
packets of 512 bytes with different data rates. To compute the average value of the
metrics we want to derive, we simulated each scenario 3 times. In each different
simulation, we choose different source-destination pairs. We have two variations of
the simulation setup to evaluate the performance of our modified routing scheme
compared to the standard OLSR. The common simulation parameters of the two
variations are summarized in Table 5.1.
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5.3.2.1 Setup A
In this setup, we want to evaluate the modified OLSR using the performance
metrics that will give us clear view of the performance in terms of energy consump-
tion. These metrics introduced in the previous section are: Average residual energy
vs time and Distribution of node residual energy. For this setup we consider a static
scenario with the parameters described in Table I. In addition, the packet interar-
rival time is 0.1sec, which means that the source nodes send 10 packets/sec (around
41 Kbps). The simulation time is set to 250 sec.
5.3.2.2 Setup B
In this setup, we want to examine the performance of our modified OLSR
compared to standard OLSR in a variety of static and mobile scenarios. These
scenarios have the common parameters described in Table I. The two performance
metrics that we will consider are Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and Network Lifetime
(in sec). The simulations are done with 4 different packet interarrival times to study
the effect of low, medium and high traffic rate in our scheme. The intervals are 0.1
sec (10 packets/sec or around 41 Kbps), 0.075 sec (14 packets/sec or around 55
Kbps), 0.05 sec (20 packets/sec or around 81 Kbps) and 0.025 sec (40 packets/sec
or around 163 Kbps). At shorter intervals, a lot of packets will be lost due to network
congestion and the bandwidth limitations, that we have set up for our experiments
in NS3. Thus, we will notice a significant decrease in PDR as the interval becomes
smaller. We also consider three different scenarios in terms of mobility: static, low
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mobility and high mobility. In the low mobility scenario, mobile nodes move in
the area based on a Random Waypoint mobility model with maximum speed of 2
m/sec. In the high mobility scenario, nodes move based on a Random Waypoint
mobility model with maximum speed of 20 m/sec. Finally, the simulation time is
set to 150 sec for taking, under different data rates, comparative measurements for
PDR. For network lifetime measurements, we execute the simulations until a node
is completely depleted.
5.3.3 Simulation Results
In the following subsections, the results of our simulations in NS3 for Setup A
and Setup B are presented.
5.3.3.1 Simulation Setup A
In this setup, we consider a static scenario with data rate of 10 packets/sec for
our traffic flows. The purpose is to perform an energy analysis of the behavior of our
modified scheme in comparison with standard OLSR. Hence, we examine the two
performance metrics described in the section 5.3.1.: Average Node Residual Energy
vs Time and Distribution of node residual energy.
For the first performance metric considered, we present the results in Fig-
ure 5.2. The observation is that our modified scheme leads to a lower average power
consumption than standard OLSR. We notice that there are 10-15% energy savings
by using the modified OLSR.
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Figure 5.2: Average Residual Energy in Simulation Setup A
For the distribution of node residual energy, we present the results in Fig-
ure 5.3. We observe that in the modified OLSR than half of the nodes that have
residual energy between 30-70% at the end of the simulation time (250 sec). On the
other hand, in the standard OLSR there are a lot of nodes that have small percent-
age of residual energy or large percentage of residual energy. Thus, this indicates
that our modified scheme achieves more uniform utilization of network resources by
adjusting the weights and dispersing the traffic through different paths to reduce
energy consumption. On the other hand, the standard OLSR selects the same paths
to the destination nodes and utilizes the same intermediate nodes, which leads to
fast depletion of their energy.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of node residual energy in Setup A
5.3.3.2 Simulation Setup B
In this setup, we consider static and mobile scenarios and also different data
rates. The purpose of this experimentation is to examine whether the modified
scheme contributes to the increase of network lifetime, but at the same time without
loss of performance (in terms of PDR). The different mobility patterns indicate the
behavior of the modified scheme under different network dynamics. We run three
simulations with different source and destination pairs in the network.
In the static scenario, we observe in Figure 5.5 that the modified OLSR
achieves improvement of 5-20% in network lifetime, in comparison with the standard
OLSR. This indicates that the modified scheme selects alternative paths, maybe
longer paths, when an intermediate node has consumed most of its energy, and by-
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PDR (in %) in terms of Ideal Number of Transmitted Packets
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.4: PDR for different packet interarrival times (static scenario)
passes the energy ”weak” node. In addition, PDR has an improvement of up to
10% in the case of the modified OLSR (Figure 5.4). This is justified from the fact
that queue utilization is taken into account as part of our weight function. Thus,
the modified OLSR imposes higher weight to congested nodes, that are most likely
to cause loss of packets, and avoids to choose to forward packets through them in
the routing procedure. This causes this slight improvement in PDR.
In the low mobility scenario, we observe (Figures 5.6 and 5.7) similar results
with the static scenario. There is 5-15% improvement in network lifetime and PDR
for the reasons explained above. In the high mobility scenario, the improvement in
the network lifetime is lower than in the other cases (Figures 5.8 and 5.9), due to
the fact that the mobility imposes dynamic change of intermediate nodes selected
for routing. In this scenario, both the standard and the modified OLSR select
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Lifetime in terms of one intermediate node (in sec)
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.5: Network Lifetime for different packet interarrival times (static scenario)
several different routes during simulation. In addition, PDR remains the same as
in the standard OLSR and at some rates is being slightly decreased. This effect
comes from the lack of robustness of our scheme to adapt to highly changing dy-
namic environments. In high mobility conditions, the modified OLSR cannot learn
the weights fast enough to take the routing decisions and this leads to more than
expected packet losses.
Overall, in static and low mobility scenarios, we notice better PDR than in
high mobility scenarios, due to the fact that our protocols have slow convergence in
rapidly changing dynamics. In addition, in high mobility scenarios, we achieve
greater network lifetime than in the other two scenarios, because the protocols
choose a lot of different alternative paths due to the dynamic changes in the network
topology. Finally, in all three scenarios, as we increase the data rate we observe
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PDR (in %) in terms of Ideal Number of Transmitted Packets
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.6: PDR for different packet interarrival times (low mobility)






















Lifetime in terms of one intermediate node (in sec)
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.7: Network Lifetime for different packet interarrival times (low mobility)
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PDR (in %) in terms of Ideal Number of Transmitted Packets
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.8: PDR for different packet interarrival times (high mobility)





















Lifetime in terms of one intermediate node (in sec)
Standard OLSR
Modified OLSR
Figure 5.9: Network Lifetime for different packet interarrival times (high mobility)
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decrease in PDR and in network lifetime. In the case of higher rates, a lot of packets
are lost due to network congestion and bandwidth limitations (link bandwidth 1
Mbps), which results to the decrease of the PDR. In addition, network lifetime is
decreased due to the transmission (and retransmission from the MAC layer) of large
number of packets in the case of high data rates.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed a novel multi-metric energy efficient routing
scheme, integrated in the OLSR routing protocol. Three cross-layer parameters,
which indicate energy depletion, are considered to form a weight, representing the
cost of routing through this node. Node weights are updated and sent to the network
through TC packets periodically to be taken into consideration for routing decisions.
We evaluated the Modified OLSR under a range of different scenarios, varying traffic
load and mobility pattern. The modified version of the OLSR achieves significant
increase in network lifetime (5-20%), without loss of performance (in terms of PDR).
Future work includes experimenting on larger networks. In large networks
we may have slow routing protocol convergence by relying to TC messages, hence
the robustness of our scheme needs to be investigated. In addition, we are cur-
rently working on the formulation of an optimization problem, in order to assign
appropriate weights according to the current state of the network.
125
CHAPTER 6
Distributed Energy-Aware Sensor Coverage: A Game Theo-
retic Approach
In the two previous chapters, we proposed and implemented energy efficient
schemes, which can be easily integrated to existing routing protocols used for dif-
ferent types of wireless multi-hop networks. In this chapter, we investigate energy-
aware sensor coverage, which is a crucial aspect of the operation of wireless sensor
networks.
6.1 Overview
Efficient monitoring of large areas has attracted great interest from the re-
search community in the recent past. Monitoring incorporates the collection and
process of measurements related to temperature, humidity and other quantities of
interest. For this purpose, mobile sensor networks (MSN) are being used to cover
large areas under surveillance. Examples include coverage via large video cameras,
environmental monitoring, monitoring for threats, monitoring for transportation
congestion and efficiency, monitoring for medical and other emergencies. Sensor
126
networks are also used in smart grid technologies. Mobile sensors have limited
memory and energy resources and this needs to be taken into consideration while
deploying such a sensor network, in order not these resources to be depleted.
In this chapter, we examine the mobile sensor coverage problem, while address-
ing the energy limitations of such types of networks. Mobile nodes aim to collectively
optimize a global objective by making optimal local decisions. The objective is to
maximize the benefits from coverage in a particular area and simultaneously mini-
mize energy consumption due to sensing.
The energy-aware coverage problem is modeled using a game theoretic ap-
proach, where all the mobile sensor nodes participate in a game. Similar approaches,
which use game theory for coverage problems have been presented in [95], [26], [27].
The goal of this approach is to introduce an efficient learning rule that ensures the
existence of a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) [96] and guarantees the convergence to
NE.
We propose a distributed learning rule, based on [25], which enables a bit-
valued information exchange over a communication graph. Our learning strategy
focuses on optimizing the welfare of the game (i.e., sum of individual agents’ utilities)
for any arbitrary design of utility functions. We show that our algorithm induces a
perturbed Markov chain and moreover, we prove convergence to a pure NE.
127
6.1.1 Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed for the sensor coverage problem in-
cluding some recent advancements [26], [27]. In [97], an optimization problem is
defined to maximize sensors’ coverage while taking into account the communication
cost. Another method for sensor coverage has been introduced in [98], where the
authors propose an estimation model consisting of a summation of n distributions
and the estimation algorithm adjusts the weighting functions of these distributions.
However, the proposed estimation scheme does not scale satisfactorily with n.
Game theoretic approaches have also been widely adopted to optimize sensor
coverage problems. The approach was introduced in [23] and [24] and has been
used for solving decision making problems in a multi-agent setup. Martinez et
al. [26] propose a game-theoretic approach for distributed coverage using a mobile
sensor network and they introduce a novel utility function that captures the trade-
off between efficient coverage and energy consumption. [27] studies a sensor coverage
potential game, using reinforcement learning, with a utility function that takes into
consideration energy consumption due to sensing and movement.
A variety of decentralized learning rules have been proposed for optimal action
selection. Some of them are independent of the utility design, but are still proved to
lead to a pure NE. We propose a similar learning rule in our work, which is optimal
for a broad class of utility functions. In [99], Marden et al. proposed a decentralized
learning algorithm to address the issue of unknown payoff structure. The proposed
algorithm allows agents to learn actions that lead to welfare maximization without
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any knowledge of the functional form of the utilities. The algorithm can be used
for optimization of complex systems with many distributed components, such as
the routing of data packets in networks and the design and control of wind farms.
However, the convergence of this algorithm is guaranteed only under an assump-
tion on the form of the utilities called “interdependence”. To overcome this, new
decentralized learning rules were proposed by Menon et al. in [25] and [100]. The
learning rule in [25] uses a bit-valued inter-agent communication and is proved to
converge to a NE, without the interdependence property for the utility functions. In
our work, we modify this distributed learning algorithm to model the energy-aware
mobile sensor coverage game and derive new (relaxed) conditions for convergence to
NE. We have introduced a variation of this algorithm for continuous action space,
which is then partitioned into a finite set of states.
6.1.2 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we present three main contributions in this problem. Firstly,
we design a suitable utility function to capture the trade-off between sensing/processing
and energy consumption. We have defined novel coverage utility and optimization
functions for our overall utility function. Secondly, we propose a distributed learning
rule that enables bit-valued communication between the agents. Finally, we analyze
and prove the convergence to a NE. Our proposed distributed learning algorithm
also supports the case of continuous action space, which is essential for the mobile




The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the prelim-
inaries on game theory and perturbed Markov chains for the energy-aware coverage
problem. Section 6.3 describes the problem statement and gives an introduction
to our approach. Section 6.4 contains the description of the distributed learning
algorithm, the analysis of the proposed algorithm, and the proof of convergence.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6.5.
6.2 Preliminary Background
6.2.1 Game Theory Background
In this section, we provide some basic definitions from game theory [26], [96],
[101] that we use for our model. Based on these principles, we formulate the energy-
aware optimal coverage problem as a cooperative game among the sensor nodes.
Definition 6.2.1. A strategic game Γ =< V ,A,U > consists of:
1. A set V of heterogeneous players, where i ∈ V = {1, . . . , N}.
2. An action set A :=
∏N
i=1Ai, the space of all actions, where αi ∈ Ai is the ac-
tion of player i and an (multiplayer) action α ∈ A has components α1, . . . , αN .
3. The utility function Ui : A → R, which models the payoff of player i over
action profiles.
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The notion of NE [101] is crucial in game theory setup and is defined as follows:
Definition 6.2.3. Consider the strategic game Γ. An action profile α∗ := (α∗i , α
∗
−i)




An action profile corresponding to a NE indicates an action in which no player
has benefit to deviate. The objective of the multi-agent system is to collaboratively
maximize the welfare function W ∗ = maxα∈AW (α), where W (α) =
∑N
i=1 Ui(α).
6.2.2 Perturbed Markov Chains
In this section, we describe the definitions and the theory of perturbed Markov
chains [25], [102]. Let P (0) be the 1-step transition probability matrix of a Markov
chain on a finite state space S. We refer to this chain as the unperturbed chain.
Definition 6.2.4. A regular perturbation of P (0) consists of a stochastic matrix
valued function P (ε) on some non-degenerate interval (0, a] that satisfies, for all
x, y ∈ S,
1. P (ε) is irreducible and aperiodic for all ε ∈ (0, a],
2. lim
ε→0
Px,y(ε) = Px,y(0) and





From the first condition in Def. (6.2.4) we conclude that there exists a unique
stationary distribution µ(ε), which satisfies µ(ε)P (ε) = µ(ε) for each ε ∈ (0, a]. The
other two conditions indicate how the perturbed chain converges to the unperturbed
one as ε→ 0.




bi for some ai ∈ R, bi ≥ 0, Dom(f) =
(0,∞)} for some large enough but fixed L ∈ N, where C∞ is the space of smooth
functions.
We introduce some notation that will be helpful while stating the main result
regarding perturbed Markov chains. The parameter r(x, y) is called the 1-step tran-
sition resistance from state x to y. Notice that r(x, y) = 0 holds only for the one
step transitions x → y allowed under P (0). A path h(a → b) from a state a ∈ S
to b ∈ S is an ordered set {a = x1, x2, . . . , xn = b} ⊆ S, such that every transition
xk → xk+1 in the sequence has positive 1-step probability according to P (ε). The





Definition 6.2.5. For any two states x and y, the resistance from x to y is defined
by ρ(x, y) = min{r(h)| h(x→ y) is a path}.






Hence, ρ(x, y) can be defined as the minimum resistance over all possible paths
starting at state x and ending at state y. The co-radius indicates the maximum
resistance that must be overcome in order to enter it from outside. We extend the
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definition of resistance to include resistance between two subsets S1, S2 ⊂ S:
ρ(S1, S2) = min
x∈S1,y∈S2
ρ(x, y). (6.2)
Since P (ε) is irreducible for ε > 0, ρ(S1, S2) <∞ for all S1, S2 ⊂ S.
Definition 6.2.7. A recurrence or communication class of a Markov chain is a
non-empty subset of states E ⊆ S such that for any x, y ∈ E, ∃ h(x → y) and for
any x ∈ E and y ∈ S \ E, @ h(x→ y).
Let us denote the recurrence classes of the unperturbed chain P (0) asE1, ..., EM
and E = {E1, E2, · · ·EM}. Let us consider a directed graph GRC on the vertex set
{1, ...,M} with each vertex corresponding to a recurrence class. Let a j-tree be a
spanning subtree in GRC that contains a unique directed path from each vertex in
{1, ...,M} \ {j} to j and denote the set of all j-trees in GRC by T jRC .






Let γ∗ = minEi γ(Ei). Finally, we can state the main result regarding per-
turbed Markov chains, based on [102].
Theorem 6.2.9 ( [102]). Let E1, ..., EM denote the recurrence classes of the Markov
chain P (0) on a finite state space S. Let P (ε) be a regular perturbation of P (0) and
let µ(ε) denote its unique stationary distribution. Then,
1. As ε→ 0, µ(ε)→ µ(0), where µ(0) is a stationary distribution of P (0) and
2. A state is stochastically stable i.e. µx(0) > 0⇔ x ∈ Ei such that γ(Ei) = γ∗.
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6.3 Problem Statement
In this work, we analyze a scenario of a Mobile Sensor Network (MSN), where
sensors are randomly deployed in an area and their task is to monitor this area.
The tasks of the sensors are to optimally move in the area since not all parts of the
area are equally valuable at all time. In addition, sensors are equipped with limited
battery power that should be spent judicially throughout the monitoring procedure.
Hence, mobile sensors aim at maximizing the payoff from sensing specific portions
of the area, while minimizing the overall energy consumption. Since the ultimate
task is global for all the sensors, they unanimously have to decide their actions, in
order to perform the above mentioned trade-off. This multi-agent trade-off problem
can be formalized as a multi-player game [26].
A motivation example for the sensor coverage problem using game theoretic
approach is presented in Fig. 6.1. In this example, there are 5 sensors (agents),
which aim at maximizing the coverage over the monitoring area and the function of
significance is stepwise. The function of significance defines the utility of coverage
and is defined a priori by doing an inspection on the area based on the objective. In
our example, there are two parts of the coverage area that have significance function
equal to 10 and 5 respectively. For example, if our objective is to measure the tem-
perature and the humidity in a building, we could use a similar stepwise function
and allow more significance to the offices rather than the corridors of the building.
In the given example, we observe that by using the game theoretic approach, the
different nodes cooperate and avoid deploying additional coverage (in the case they
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Figure 6.1: Coverage Example
did not cooperate), which would lead to energy consumption. Hence, in this exam-
ple, one node covers the area with significance function equal to 10, the other node
covers the area with significance function equal to 5 and the other 3 nodes remain
idle in order not to reduce energy due to coverage.
We define the action profile (in game theoretic sense) at time t by at and
the corresponding action for the the i-th agent is (at)i in our game. The action
in this scenario consists of selecting the position ot and the radius of sensing rt.
We treat the sensors to be points in the space and they can sense a circular region
centering itself for some prespecified radius. We consider a two-dimensional area,
which is discretized into a lattice. Each square of the lattice has unit dimensions
and is labeled with the coordinate of its center p = (px, py). The collection of all
squares of the lattice is denoted by P . The sensors can place themselves only at
these lattice centers and they have the privilege to choose a sensing radius around
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them. As can be predicted the higher the radius the higher the energy expenditure





t )i) ∈ P . The sensing area is defined by a disc with radius (rt)i that
takes values within a range [rmin, rmax] ⊂ R. Each agent’s action can be modeled as
a tuple of the position and the radius. Hence, for agent i the action is denoted as
(at)i := ((ot)i, (rt)i) ∈ (At−1)i, where (At−1)i is the available action set for agent i at
time t. The action profile for all agents is at = ((at)1, . . . , (at)N) ∈ A =
∏N
i=1(At−1)i.
The current available action set contains the time index t − 1, since this set may
be constrained based on the action chosen at time t − 1, i.e. formally speaking
At−1 = A(at−1).
6.4 Game Theoretic Approach
In this section, the utility function for the game is formulated and we also de-
scribe a distributed algorithm, which can be used to achieve a NE for the underlying
game.
6.4.1 Utility Design
As described before, the utility function should capture the trade-off between
the effectiveness of sensor coverage and the energy consumption caused by sensing.
At this point, suppose that we have examined a priori the coverage space and that
we have defined a function of significance over the space X. We denote this function
by f : X → R. The lattice structure P is constructed over this space X. In order
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to find the covered area by a sensor, we define a disk Di((ot)i, (rt)i) centered at (ot)i
with radius (rt)i around the sensor-agent. Hence, the total area which is sensed by










We also need to define the energy consumption caused by sensing, transmitting
and receiving packets from other agents. The energy consumption due to sensing
and reception is proportional to the covered region. This can be modeled by Econsi =
Ci((rt)i)
2, where Ci > 0 is a constant that depend on the sensor.
The trade-off between the coverage gain and energy consumption for agent i
is captured in Ui in the following way
Ui(αt) = F ((αt)i)− Econsi ((αt)i) (6.5)
In our case, the objective is to maximize W =
∑N
i=1 Ui and hence we seek for
actions:
A∗ = {arg max
a∈A
W (a)}
In the following section, we state the distributed learning strategy for our
energy-aware coverage game. However, it should be noted that the algorithm defined
and analyzed in the following section is general for all similar multi-agent games and
we use the sensor coverage problem as an direct application of the algorithm.
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6.4.2 Distributed Learning Strategy
In this section, we describe the distributed learning strategy that is used to
reach a NE. The distributed algorithm is based on the recent work [25], [99]. How-
ever, several modifications were needed for our purpose. Our framework consists of
the communication graph Gc, which is a directed graph representing the explicit in-
formation exchange between the agents. The directed edge (i, j) in Gc(at) indicates
that agent i is able to send a message to agent j at time t, when the joint action at
is chosen. We define the neighbors of agent i at time t for the action profile at in
the communication graph as Ni(at).
We partition the continuous action space into finite number of states such that
R = {ri|i = 1, 2, .., k} where ri’s are disjoint intervals within [rmin, rmax] satisfying
∪ki=1ri = [rmin, rmax]. Each agent selects the radius by a Gibbs distribution, given in
Eq. (6.6). Let (At−1)i be the set of feasible actions for agent i at time t, (At−1)ri
denote the feasible components corresponding to the radius and (At−1)oi correspond
to the position of the mobile sensor.
The conditional probability for agent k choosing a radius from set rj given
the center of the sensor to be at o and the immediate past join action to be aj is
considered to be














where m(ri) is the measure of the set ri i.e. the length of the corresponding interval
in this case.
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Uk(r̂i,o,a−j); where r̂i is an interior point of
the interval ri determined by the mean value theorem. Let us denote a finite set
R̂ = {r̂1, r̂2, · · · r̂k}. With slight abuse of notation, representing Uk(a, b, c) = Uak for
fixed b and c, we can write (6.6) as follows











Let r̂∗ ∈ (At−1)rk ⊆ R̂ such that U
r̂∗
i = maxrj∈(At−1)rk U
r̂j














This gives us the resistance between actions [Def. 6.2.4].
Each agent i is endowed with a state (xt)i = [(at)i, (mt)i] at time t, where
(at)i corresponds to the action taken and (mt)i is a {0, 1}-valued mood of the agent
i at time t. As described in [25], (m)i = 1 is defined as the content state and
(m)i = 0 is defined as the discontent state of the agent i. The moods of the agents
are being exchanged through the communication graph Gc(t) at time t. We assume
that the communication radius is different than the coverage radius and that the
energy consumption due to communication is insignificant in comparison to the en-
ergy consumption due to coverage, because we only enable bit-value communication
between the agents and no other information exchange.
The collection of the states of all agents at time t is represented as xt =
139
[at,mt]. For a given state x, we denote the joint action by a
x and joint mood by mx;
and similarly the action and the mood of i-th agent is denoted by (ax)i and (m
x)i
respectively.
Let {εt}t∈N with limt→∞ εt = 0 and constant l > 0, are pre-specified. The agent
i performs the following rules sequentially to update its action when the joint action
in the last step was at−1. The performance does not depend on the initialization of
the algorithm and it can be initialized randomly.
Algorithm 6.4.1.
Start
Step 1: Receive (mt−1)j from all j ∈ Ni(t − 1) i.e. the neighbors of i in
Gc(t− 1). Calculate the temporary mood m̃i as follows:
1. If (mt−1)j = 1 ∀j ∈ {i} ∪ Ni(t− 1) set m̃i = 1;
2. else set m̃i = 0.
Step 2: Pick (at)i = (oi, ri) as follows:
pti(o, r|at−1) = pti(o|at−1)pti(r|o, at−1), and pti(r|o, at−1) as given in (6.7). The
choice of o is independent of at−1 i.e. p
t
i(o|at−1) = pti(o).
1. If m̃i = 1, pick oi from (At−1)oi according to the following rules:
p(o) =












Step 3: Update the payoff (Ut)i = Ui((at)) and define U
∗
i = max(at)i(Ut)i.
Step 4: Update the mood (mt)i as follows:
1. if m̃i = 1 and ((at)i, (Ut)i) = ((at−1)i, (Ut−1)i), set (mt)i ∼ Ber(1− εlt);
2. if m̃i = 0 or (m̃i = 1 and ((at)i, (Ut)i) 6= ((at−1)i, (Ut−1)i))
set (mt)i ∼ Ber(ε
U∗i −(Ut)i
t ).
where Ber(·) is the Bernoulli distribution.
Step 5: Broadcast (mt)i to the neighbors in Gc(t).
Stop
Thus the learning strategy induces a non-homogeneous perturbed Markov
chain P (εt) with state space in A× {0, 1}N . Let us denote U∗i − (Ut)i by βi3 which
in general depends on the joint action a and hence on the state x. Sometimes, we







| n(ε), d(ε) ∈ L and deg(n(ε)) ≥ deg(d(ε))
}
, where deg(f(ε)) is
the lowest exponent of ε present in f(ε).
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Proposition 6.4.2. The distributed learning (Alg. 6.4.1) induces a perturbed Markov
chain.
Proof. Firstly, it is trivial to check that ∀x, y ∈ S limε→0 Px,y(ε) = Px,y(0). This is
a direct consequence of the fact that Px,y(ε) ∈ E for all x, y ∈ S.
Secondly, consider any state xt−1 = [at−1,mt−1] at time t − 1; for an agent i,
irrespective of the modes of itself and others, it can choose the same action (at)i =
(at−1)i = [oi, ri] at time t with a probability at least min{(1−εlt), 1/|(At−1)oi |}p(ri|oi, at−1)
[Alg. 6.4.1, Step 2]. Similarly the agent can choose any other action at time t with
some probability strictly great than 0 (the exact lower bound on this probability
can be calculated from step 2 of Alg. 6.4.1). The mood (mt)i can be changed to
1 with probability at least min{(1 − εlt), ε
βi3
t }, and can be set to 0 with probability
greater than min{εlt, 1 − ε
βi3
t }. Hence the chain is irreducible and aperiodic at the
same time.
From the structure of the probabilities defined in (6.7) and the steps 1.3, 2.1









bni ; αni ∈ R, bni+1 > bni ≥ 0, Ln ∈ N





bdi ; αdi ∈ R, bdi+1 > bdi ≥ 0 and Ld ∈ N. Therefore
deg(n(ε)) = bn0 and deg(d(ε)) = b
d
0(≤ bn0 ). Hence, limε→0 εdeg(d(ε))−deg(n(ε))Px,y(ε) =
αn0
αd0
. Therefore, Px,y(ε) satisfies all the three properties of a perturbed Markov chain
enlisted in definition 6.2.4.
Remark 6.4.3. A direct consequence of Proposition 6.4.2 is that P (ε) is a regular
perturbation of P (0) and P (ε) has a stationary distribution µ(ε) that converges to
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µ(0) (a stationary distribution of P (0)) as ε→ 0 [Theorem 6.2.9].
Definition 6.4.4. Let, C0 = {x ∈ S| mx = 1, (ax)i = (o, r) s.t. r = r̂∗(o, ax)} and
D0 = {x ∈ S| mx = 0, (ax)i = (o, r) s.t. r = r̂∗(o, ax)}
where r̂∗(o, a
x) = arg minr∈R̂ p(r, o, (a











rn ∈ R is the interval such that r̂n ∈ rn.
Lemma 6.4.5. ( [25]) If for every a ∈ A, Gc(a) is strongly connected, the recurrence
classes of the unperturbed chain P (0) are D0 and the singletons z ∈ C0.
Proof. Setting εt = 0 in the Alg. 6.4.1, we can easily notice that mt−1 = 0 implies
mt = 0. So D
0 is a recurrence class according to P (0). Similarly, mt−1 = 1 implies
all (mt)i = 1 by step 1 of the algorithm. The step 2.1 of Alg. 6.4.1 along with (6.7)
ensures all the agents select their previous actions. Hence each element of C0 is a
separate recurrence class.
Lemma 6.4.6. Under the same assumption as in Lemma 6.4.5, for any x, x′ ∈ C0,
y, y′ ∈ D0, and z ∈ S\(C0 ∪D0):





ρ(x, x′) = l|η|, s.t. η = {i : (ox)i 6= (ox
′
)i}, (6.13)
ρ(y, y′) = 0, (6.14)
ρ(z, y) = 0, (6.15)
Proof. Let k be the smallest number such that one can choose a set I ⊂ {1, 2, .., N}
of k agents in a way that I ∪ (∪i∈INi) is the whole set of agents V = {1, 2, · · · , N}.
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To change from a state in C0 to a state in D0, the agents i ∈ I should change
their moods using either step 4.1 or the combination of steps 2.1 (changing action)
and 4.2. Both of these changes incur the same resistance l. ∀j ∈ Ni, m̃j = 0 as
soon as mi = 0. Mood mj can be changed to 0 via a zero resistance path by step
4.2. Therefore k such agents need to change their moods so that all the agents can
change their moods and hence the new state belongs to D0. Note that, the change
of the action a = [o, r] under m̃i = 0 can be done with zero resistance using step 2.2
and (6.7). This proves Eq. (6.11) and obviously k ≤ N .
For a change of state from D0 to any state in C0, the actions can be selected
via a zero resistance path as in step 2.2. Since all m̃i = 0, mi has to be made equal




3(x) and hence Eq. (6.12)
is obtained.
For a change from x ∈ C0 to x′ ∈ C0, if any agent i has its center oi different
from its previous value, it can make such a change in action via a path of resistance
l by step 2.1 or it can change its mood with resistance l and then choose the action
ax
′
with a zero resistance path using step 2.2, and finally change its mood with
resistance βi3 by step 4.2. However, for the latter case, since agent i’s change of
mood will affect m̃j ∀j ∈ Ni. Thus, the neighbors need a change from m̃j = 0 to
mj = 1 by resistance β
j
3. Therefore, the minimum resistance for such a change will
be used to adopt the former strategy, i.e. changing action using step 2.1, incurring
a resistance l. By denoting η = {i : (ox)i 6= (ox
′
)i} and the cardinality of η by |η|,
we arrive at Eq. (6.13), where (ox)i is the center of the i-th agent at state x.
All the states in D0 are accessible from one another under the unperturbed
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Markov chain P (0) and Eq. (6.14) holds.
Note that the Gc(a) is strongly connected and we divide the agents into two
groups V0 = {i| m̃i = 0} and V1 = {i| m̃i = 1}. Due to the strong connectivity
assumption, for all i ∈ V1, ∃j ∈ V0 such that there is a path from j to i. Therefore,
agents in V0 can change their actions with 0 resistance (step 2.2) in a way that
affects the utility of some i ∈ V1 and as a consequence mi = 0 with zero resistance
(step 4.2). Thus finally for all i ∈ V , mi = 0. This fact along with Eq. (6.14)
implies (6.15).
Lemma 6.4.7. The stochastically stable set of states is {xi ∈ C0| W (axi) = W ∗}.
Proof. The proof follows the similar line of thoughts as done in [25] by constructing
the j − trees (Def. 6.2.8) rooted at {xi ∈ C0| W (axi ) = W ∗} and comparing it to
the other j − trees rooted at other nodes. However few difference should be noted
here that:
1. An outward edge from D0 to xi has a resistance of 0 (Alg. 6.4.1 step 4.2).
In [25], it was W ∗.
2. The above fact required l > W ∗ in [25] but we do not require any such con-
straint on l.
Theorem 6.4.8 (Main Result). Let for every action a ∈ A, Gc(a) be strongly
connected. Let xt = [at,mt] denotes the state of all agents at time t, then
lim
t→∞
P (at ∈ A∗) = 1
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Proof. This Theorem is similar to Theorem 1 in [25]. Only difference in our theorem




t =∞ where κ = minEi∈E CR(Ei) and
E is the set of recurrence classes of P (0). By careful observation, we can say that
κ = 0. To show this, we proceed by finding the co-radius of xi ∈ C0 such that
W (axi) = W ∗. Let us take v ∈ D0, then ρ(v, v′) = 0 by Lemma 6.4.6 for all v′ ∈ D0.




) such that av
′
= axi . Therefore, clearly ρ(v′, xi) = 0 [Alg.
6.4.1 step 4.2] and hence ρ(v, xi) = ρ(v, v
′) +ρ(v′, xi) = 0. Now, if v ∈ S\(C0∪D0),
then ρ(v, v′) = 0 for all v′ ∈ D0 and since we already have proved that ρ(v′, xi) = 0
for all v′ ∈ D0, we can conclude ρ(v, xi) = 0 for all v ∈ S\(C0 ∪ D0). Therefore
CR(xi) = 0 and that implies κ = 0.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we present a game theoretic methodology to solve the energy-
aware coverage problem for mobile sensor networks (MSN) in a decentralized fash-
ion. The utility function captures the trade-off between the efficient coverage and
the energy consumption due to sensing, receiving packets and localization. The de-
centralized learning algorithm incorporates the exchange of certain bit-valued infor-
mation between the agents over a directed communication graph. Finally, we prove
that this algorithm converges to a NE. However, unlike the previous work [25], the
convergence of εt is not constrained and consequently the convergence to NE.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work Directions
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we propose lightweight and efficient schemes from a practi-
cal, but also a more theoretical point of view, for secure and energy efficient protocol
design for wireless multi-hop networks.
First of all, we present a novel framework for mitigating control and data
plane attacks against wireless network protocols. We use the component-based pro-
tocol design to change the protocol functionality in a modular way in response to
a variety of attacks. We have proposed a set of mitigation techniques, which are
incorporated into protocol components and are reusable across different protocols
of the same class. These mitigation techniques utilize the trust estimates to modify
each component’s functionality. The performance evaluation of these techniques
indicates high performance recovery in different attack scenarios. Furthermore, we
investigate the network performance and security tradeoff by introducing security
considerations in the cross layer design of network protocols via network utility max-
imization. We use trust values propagated through the networks as the notion for
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security. This approach provides a unified framework to introduce security through
soft constraints in the optimization problem. In this way, users get higher utility by
forwarding data through nodes of higher trust values and the resulting trust-aware
protocols are resilient to attacks and network failures. We have also introduced
delay constraints in the utility optimization problem to capture QoS requirements.
In the second part of this dissertation, we propose efficient distributed sleep
management techniques for battery powered nodes in heterogeneous wireless machine-
to-machine networks. The distributed sleep management techniques enable each
battery-powered node to decide the optimal times to sleep or wake up and pro-
cess data based on traffic measurements and predictions. We also propose two
novel battery energy aware routing metrics, battery node energy waste (EW) and
battery node relay cost (RC), which are used for path selection. The sleep man-
agement schemes and the energy aware routing metrics can be easily incorporated
into existing protocols. In this work, we integrated the proposed schemes into a
standard routing protocol for M2M networks, called B-RPL. We illustrate the ef-
fectiveness of our techniques by conducting extensive simulations. The results show
significant improvement in terms of network lifetime and packet delivery ratio in
comparison with benchmark cases. In addition, we introduce a novel multi-metric
energy efficient routing scheme for mobile ad-hoc networks, which we integrated in
the standard OLSR routing protocol to create the Modified OLSR routing scheme.
Three cross-layer parameters, which indicate energy depletion, are considered to
form a weight, representing the cost of routing through this node. We evaluated
the Modified OLSR under a range of different scenarios, varying traffic load and
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mobility pattern to indicate its efficiency in comparison with standard OLSR pro-
tocol. Finally, we present a game theoretic methodology to capture the tradeoff
between sensor coverage and energy consumption in mobile sensor networks (MSN).
We formulate an appropriate utility function to capture this trade-off and we pro-
pose a decentralized learning algorithm that incorporates the exchange of certain
bit-valued information between the agents over a directed communication graph.
Finally, we prove that this algorithm converges to a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
7.2 Future Work Directions
7.2.1 Component Activation Engine
As part of the future work for Chapter 2, we propose an automated mecha-
nism to select the appropriate mitigation technique to be activated based on the
network state and the observed performance of the implemented mitigation tech-
niques under different environmental conditions. The decision making module is
called Component Activation Engine and will use a combination of selection-rules
and learning algorithms to handle the network dynamics, the noisy and false trust
estimates, and the unpredictability of the attacks. Rule-based approach is running
in the foreground of the engine in order to take fast decisions regarding the mit-
igated components that are going to be activated under a specific network state.
We define by network state the number, the position of compromised nodes and
the nature attack that they deploy. The established rules have been tested for their
efficiency in terms of performance recovery in specific network states (environmen-
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tal conditions). However, the engine needs additional mechanisms to deal with the
dynamics of the environment, the noisy trust estimates and the unpredictability
of the attacks. In order to adapt to these dynamics, the engine uses a numerical
reward feedback derived from network performance measurements (e.g. throughout
and latency) to evaluate the effectiveness of the activated mitigation technique. If
the technique is ineffective, then its potential is being decreased for the specific
network state. To provide ongoing, feedback-driven refinement of the rule set, we
propose to use a reinforcement learning framework as introduced in [103] and [104]
and in particular Collaborative Reinforcement Learning (CRL) as proposed in [105].
CRL is a self-organizing technique with the ability to perform complex collective
tasks and to adapt system behavior or structure in a dynamic network environment,
i.e., the one under attack or undergoing other frequent and unpredictable changes.
It also enables distributed agents to solve decision-making problems online in dy-
namic networks using only partial knowledge of the environment. Therefore, CRL
framework is crucial for our Component Activation engine, because it will establish
new rules and also refine the already existing ones. CRL framework will run in
the background and will compute the potential (effectiveness) of various mitigation
techniques (actions taken by the engine) in different network states by taking into
account the network performance measurements, which will take as feedback from
this action. When the potential for a specific action passes a certain threshold,
then the engine inserts the action in the rule set. Therefore, CRL framework will
continuously generate and update rules for different network states.
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7.2.2 Structured Node Placement in Heterogeneous M2M Networks
As part of the future work for Chapter 4, we investigate an algorithm for ef-
ficient placement of mains-powered nodes in the network in order to increase the
efficiency of our scheme. We observed from the performance evaluation of this
chapter that there was a significant increase in packet delivery ratio in the scenario
that the mains-powered nodes were placed in a structured way around the gateway
node. However, our proposed approach that was used in terms of performance eval-
uation is heuristic and we plan to introduce a more formal optimization approach.
Krause et. al in [106] proposed a submodular optimization algorithm for efficient
sensor placement, which maximizes the mutual information received from the sen-
sor nodes. Another algorithm for efficient sensor placement was proposed in [107],
which indicated that provides sufficient grid coverage of the sensor field. Inspired
by the above mentioned and other similar algorithms, we could introduce a new
formal optimization method for our mains-powered sensor placement that will lead
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